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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a tremendous impact on 
international trade policy. The USA was the first country to introduce cargo security and 
facilitation measures as a counteraction. The EU and international organizations also 
established new security programs in order to better secure cargo movements across 
borders. This thesis gives an overview of security initiatives introduced by international 
organizations, the EU and the USA, with an emphasis on the trade facilitation 
programs Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and Customs-Trade Partnership 
against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and a comparison of them. The process towards mutual 
recognition of these programs is then described. Three case studies put the topic 
under the microscope: The perception as well as actual benefits and disadvantages 
from economic actors' points of view are presented and implementation and 
operational processes in companies are demonstrated. The case studies include port 
authorities, carriers and logistics providers. Finally, the author reflects on his findings. 
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10+2-rule see ISF 
24H 24-Hour Advance Manifest Rule 
3PL Third Party Logistics Provider 
A.T.A. Admission Temporaire - Temporary Admission 
ABI Automated Broker Interface 
ACE Automated Commercial Environment 
AEO Authorized Economic Operator 
AEO-C Authorized Economic Operator Certificate Customs Simplifications 
AEO-F Authorized Economic Operator Certificate Customs Simplifications 
and Security and Safety 
AEO-S Authorized Economic Operator Certificate Security and Safety 
AES Automated Export System 
AIS Automated Import System 
AMS Automated Manifest System 
ATS Automated Targeting System 
bn billion 
C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
CA Customs authority 
CCL Commerce Control List 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
COMPACT Compliance Partnership Customs and Trade 
CSCMP Council of Supply Chain management Professionals 
CSI Container Security Initiative 
CSM Container Status Message 
DHS Department of Homeland Security (USA) 
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DNL Do-not-load 
DOE Department of Energy (USA) 
EAR Export Administration Regulations 
EC European Commission 
ECCN Export Control Classification Number 
ECS Export Control System 
ENS Entry Summary Declaration 
EO Economic operator 
EORI Economic Operators' Registration and Identification System 
EU European Union 
EUR Euro (currency) 
FAST Free and Secure Trade 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
 ! ! 3""" 
 
FTZ Foreign Trade Zone 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GLP Golden List Program (Jordan) 
GPS Global Pointing System 
HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (UK) 
HR Human Resource 
HTS Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
HTSUS Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (of America) 
ICS Import Control System 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISA Importer Self-Assessment 
ISCM Integrated Supply Chain Management 
ISF Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirement 
ISO International Standards Organization 
ISPS International Port Facility Security 
IT Information Technology 
MASP Multi-annual strategic plan 
mn Million 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MP Mega Ports 
MR Mutual recognition 
MRA Mutual recognition agreement 
MRN Movement Reference Number 
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act (of 2002) 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NCTS New Computerised Transit System 
NII Non-intrusive inspection 
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (USA) 
NVOCC Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers 
NYC New York City (USA) 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OSC Operation Safe Commerce 
PAS Publicly Available Standard 
PIP Partners in Protection Program (Canada) 
PVC Polyvinylchlorid (plastic material) 
RAD Regulatory Audit Division 
SAD Single Administrative Document 
SC Supply Chain 
SCAC Standard Carrier Alpha Code 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SCSS Supply chain security specialist 
SES Secure Export Scheme (New Zealand) 
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SFI Secure Freight Initiative 
sFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol 
SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
STP-Plus Secure Trade Partnership Plus (Singapore) 
TWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
U.S. United States (of America) 
U.S. CBP United States Customs and Border Protection 
U.S. DOC United States Department of Commerce 
U.S. DOT United States Department of Transportation 
UCR Unique Consignment Reference Number 
UNDG United Nations Dangerous Goods 
USA United States of America 
USD United States Dollar (currency) 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VEU Validated End User 
WCO World Trade Organization 
WMD Weapons of mass destruction 
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Globalization has an incredible drive on businesses’ logistics and transport 
services and vice versa (Kummer, Schramm, Sudy, 2010, p. 20). Shorter product life 
cycles and increasing expectations of customers have driven the importance of supply 
chains in businesses in a globalized world. In addition, more advanced technologies of 
transport and communication as well as academic research on logistics management 
have supported the evolution of an efficient global supply chain (Simchi-Levi, 
Kaminsky, & Simchi-Levi, 2008, p. 1). 
Cargo vulnerability has been a concern for a long time – companies and 
economies were however focused on the possibilities of loss, theft, and damage of 
goods. But this point of view has been changed after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when 
unforeseeable actions drew the attention of economic actors and governments to the 
threat of terrorist attacks (U.S. CBP, 2007a). The happenings of 9/11 had an 
incalculable impact on global trade. Even though the direct short-term economic effects 
of 9/11 were not great worldwide, economies and businesses have been seeking 
security after the tragedies, which has led to higher costs in the long run. One of the 
main reasons for decreasing trade was the indispensible imposition of higher security 
standards. For instance, trade between the USA and Canada has declined by more 
than 18% due solely to the imposition of security measures by the United States 
(Makinen, 2002, pp. 2-3 and 25). 
Therefore the need for trade facilitation has emerged strongly. The United States’ 
Customs and Border Protection (U.S. CBP) for instance believes that securing 
international trade can go hand-in-hand with trade facilitation (U.S. CBP, 2007a). The 
aim of U.S. CBP’s main supply chain security program, the Customs-Trade Partnership 
against Terrorism (C-TPAT), is to secure global supply chains despite strict measures 
taken by U.S. CBP in order to protect cargo entering the USA. It does so by introducing 
a voluntary cooperation between Customs and Border Protection and businesses (U.S. 
CBP, 2004a). 
After the imposition of C-TPAT the European Union (EU) also introduced a 
program, the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) which, similarly to C-TPAT, 
ensures the security and facilitation of transportation within the supply chain (German 
Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009a). 
Two well worked out programs that should ease and secure international trade in 
theory may have drawbacks for international trade when it comes to transportation in 
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global supply chains between the EU and the USA, as only businesses that are part of 
both programs would reach the highest possible facilitation when exporting from one, 
and importing into the other region. While companies can theoretically apply for both 
programs, complying with the different underlying security standards and undertaking 
different admission and verification processes is not only costly but often also a poorly 
discussed undertaking.  
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This paper has the aim of identifying and discussing the main security 
requirements and initiatives for cargo transported between the European Union and the 
United States that have an effect on international trade and operational practices of the 
companies involved. The author will highlight firms that are part of the supply chain and 
whose operations are highly influenced by security initiatives, such as carriers and 
logistics providers. 
The following questions will be answered by this thesis: 
1. Which security programs apply when transporting between the EU and the USA, 
how are they securing and facilitating trade, and what is the status quo? 
2. If there is an overlap between the programs, how could they be harmonized, and 
what is the status quo of collaboration/mutual recognition between the EU and 
the USA? 
3. What benefits do businesses gain from the implementation of cargo security 
programs?  
4. Which challenges arise from the implementation of cargo security programs? 
5. How would companies benefit from a mutual recognition/harmonization of 
different programs? 
Answering the questions above, the author tries to merge theoretical and 
practical aspects of cargo security programs, and provide a more practical insight into 
the topic. 
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In the second chapter the author presents essential background information such 
as customs procedures in the EU and USA, required terminology and basic economic 
data regarding trade. 
The third chapter of the thesis outlines theoretical aspects of cargo security 
initiatives in the EU and USA using desk research. This section can be considered as 
one of the core parts of this document. The chapter is subdivided into sections that 
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focus on security initiatives in the EU and the USA as well as a comparison of them. 
The author rounds off the chapter by showing up efforts of mutual recognition.  
The fourth chapter of this thesis consists of three case studies that reflect real-
life, up-to-date examples of business processes, operations and decisions from the 
practical point of view (Yin, 2006, pp. 1-10). This chapter forms the second core part of 
the thesis. 
Having learned about theoretical aspects, practical application and the perception 
of business units, the author brings together theory and practice in the fifth chapter, the 
conclusion, where answers to the research questions are provided. The conclusion is 
followed by a summary that gives a résumé of the theoretical aspects (chapter 3) and 
practice (chapter 4), and also sums up the conclusion (chapter 5). 
Additionally, the reader may find further interesting information in the appendix. 
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Due to the timeliness of the topic and continuous development of the initiatives 
and programs, mostly virtual, up-to-date resources were used for the desk research. 
Other resources include academic papers, articles and reference books as well as 
brochures from governmental authorities.  
For the case study, two authorities and five companies form the unit of analysis. 
(Yin, 2006, p. 22) Port authorities, carriers and logistics providers were interviewed. 
The table below gives a quick overview of the units interviewed. Appendix E 
contains more detailed information about the interviews conducted. 
Company Name Location/Interview 
 
Location/HQ Industry 
Hamburg Süd Germany Germany/EU Carrier 
Hamburg Süd USA Germany/EU Carrier 
Maersk Line Denmark Denmark/EU Carrier 
Cargo Partner USA Austria/EU LP 
DB Schenker Austria Germany/EU LP 
Port of Antwerp Belgium Belgium Port Authority 
Port of Rotterdam Netherlands Netherlands Port Authority 
Table 1: Units of analysis 
(Source: own creation) 
In order to get a more in-depth and practical insight into the topic and understand 
the effect of security programs on international trade and businesses, the author has 
conducted qualitative interviews with port authorities, carriers and logistics providers. 
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Port authorities are considered by the author to have an in-depth knowledge of ISPS 
and receive frequent feedback from the entire industry. Carriers’ core business and 
operations are directly affected by security initiatives described in the theoretical part of 
this thesis. In contrast, logistics providers operate along the whole supply chain, and 
thus have a very strong in-depth knowledge and insight into all processes, nodes and 
linkages of supply chains in general. This is extremely important, as AEO and C-TPAT 
for example deal with security issues along the whole supply chain (U.S. CBP, 2004a, 
p. 7). 
For the interviews, the author prepared a questionnaire. The form of semi-
structured interviews was chosen to allow flexibility, as well as similarly structured 
interviews with interviewees (Schnell, P., & Esser, 2005, p. 322). The interviewees 
received the opportunity to prepare for the actual interviews, as the questionnaire had 
been sent to them in advance via e-mail. The actual interviews were conducted via 
telephone, by e-mail and in person.  
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Due to the extent of a master's thesis there is no possibility to give a holistic view 
of all security initiatives. The author chose to focus on the EU and the USA as well as 
trade between them. Regulations and programs focusing on maritime cargo security 
have been emphasized in this work, as by volume this mode of transportation far 
outweighs aviation. Regulations and programs focusing on any means of land 
transportation are not dealt with in this thesis. 
In addition this thesis only covers theoretical aspects by June 2010, unless 
otherwise stated.  
As for the practical part of this work only port authorities, carriers and logistics 
providers were taken into account. Importers, exporters and other entities within the 
international supply chain have not been taken into consideration. 
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This chapter contains general information in order to: 
• Understand required terminology used in this thesis 
• Understand the importance of cargo security initiatives and cargo 
facilitation programs by recognizing the volume of trade and other 
essential data by numbers. General data about the USA and the EU are 
also presented. 
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As there is a huge variety in definitions of terms such as logistics and supply 
chain, in this section the author describes important terminology. This is especially 
important as a good understanding of basic terminology supports clear reading. 
In order to highlight how important it is to clearly define terminology, let us take 
for instance the mix of definitions regarding logistics and supply chain management. 
According to Larson and Halldorsson (2004, pp. 18-21), there are four ways that the 
relationship between these two terms can be described.  
 
Figure 1: Four different approaches to logistics and Supply Chain Management 
(Source: own creation after Larson & Halldorsson, 2004, p. 19) 
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"Logistics Management is that part of Supply Chain management that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverse flow and storage 
of goods, services and related information between the point of origin and the point of 
consumption in order to meet customers' requirements" (CSCMP, 2009, p. 3). 
In addition, the CSCMP describes the relationships and boundaries of logistics 
management as follows: "Logistics Management activities typically include inbound and 
outbound transportation management, fleet management, warehousing, materials 
handling, order fulfillment, logistics network design, inventory management, 
supply/demand planning, and management of third party logistics services providers. 
To varying degrees, the logistics function also includes sourcing and procurement, 
production planning and scheduling, packaging and assembly, and customer service. It 
is involved in all levels of planning and execution - strategic, operational and tactical. 
Logistics Management is an integrating function, which coordinates and optimizes all 
logistics activities, as well as integrates logistics activities with other functions including 
marketing, sales manufacturing, finance and information technology" (CSCMP, 2009, 
p. 3). 
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"Supply Chain Management encompasses the planning and management of all 
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all Logistics 
Management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with 
channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, 
and customers. In essence, Supply Chain Management integrates supply and demand 
management within and across companies" (CSCMP, 2009, p. 4). 
The CSMCP describes the relationships and boundaries of SCM as follows: 
"Supply Chain Management is an integrating function with primary responsibility for 
linking major business functions and business processes within and across companies 
into a cohesive and high-performing business model. It includes all of the Logistics 
Management activities noted above, as well as manufacturing operations, and it drives 
coordination of processes and activities with and across marketing, sales, product 
design, finance and information technology" (CSCMP, 2009, p. 4). 
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With regards to business, with the word "compliance" we refer to strategies in 
order to comply with certain rules, regulations, standards and laws. Compliance has 
become a powerful and indispensable tool for management control (Roth, 2000, p. 1).  
Also, compliance is a proactive approach towards changes in the environment. It 
includes information research, processing, evaluation of trends and changes in the 
environment. Additionally, one can see compliance as an early-warning system. 
Therefore it may have elements of a risk management system (Roth, 2000, p. 2).  
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This section presents the current economic situation of both regions in the focus 
of this thesis, namely the European Union and the United States of America. Data 
regarding transport and cargo handling is also presented in order to give the reader a 
general overview of the scale of cargo movement and thus the importance of cargo 
facilitation programs between the EU and the USA and vice versa. 
In order to keep data comparable, mostly data from 2008 was taken into account. 
 EU USA 
Population (mn) 496.1 305.3 
GDP (mn, USD) 18,319,168 14,204,322 
GDP per capita (mn, USD) 36,926.36 46,525.78 
Trade per capita (USD) 9,818 13,062  
Trade-to-GDP ratio 29.3% 28.7% 
Merchandise exports (f.o.b., mn, USD) 1,921,763 518,316 
Merchandise imports (c.i.f., mn, USD) 2,301,852 364,930 
Rank in merchandise world trade (excl. intra-EU) 1st exports 
1st imports 
3rd exports 
2nd imports 
Table 2: Trade indicators in the EU and the USA 
(Source: own creation after WTO, 2010) 
As Table 2 suggests, according to WCO (2010a), GDP per capita in the USA is 
approximately 25% higher than in the EU. However, when it comes to the trade-to-
GDP ratio, both regions are quite even, yet the position of the countries in world trade 
is differing. We can see that merchandise exports in the European Union are nearly 
four times as high as in the United States of America and also when it comes to 
imports the EU performs six times better compared to the USA. The EU, being an 
economic union, is clearly ranked first compared to any other country in the world if 
intra-EU trade is not taken into account. In addition, it has to be mentioned that a 
number of member countries of the EU – namely Germany, the Netherlands, France, 
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Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom – are found in the world’s top-ten importers and 
exporters list, when intra-EU trade is being accounted for (WTO, 2009, pp. 12-13). 
To understand the importance of trade between the EU and the USA, it is 
essential to know the share of the economies’ total export and import into and from 
other economies. The following graphs should help to explain the mutual 
interconnection and dependency of the EU and the USA. 
 
Figure 2: The EU's export and import breakdown 
(Source: WTO, 2010) 
Looking at Figure 2, we can recognize that the EU exports nearly a fifth of its 
merchandise to the USA, making the economy the biggest and most important export 
partner. Furthermore, when it comes to imports into the EU it is clear that the USA 
plays a huge role for the EU, with 12% of all imports coming from there. Interestingly, 
both the growth rate of exports into and imports from the United States of America 
declined from 2007 to 2008 (WTO, 2009, p. 18). 
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Figure 3: The USA's export and import breakdown 
(Source: WTO, 2010a) 
Analyzing Figure 3 one can see at once that the European Union is both the most 
important import and export partner of the United States, as the economy exports and 
imports about a fifth of its total export and import values into and from the EU. It is also 
interesting that the USA in general seems to be more dependant on the top five import 
and export partners than the EU is, as the sum of export and import ratios into and 
from the five major partners is higher. 
In other words, the EU’s imports and exports depend on its top-five trading 
partners at a rate of 45% and 50% percent, while this number goes up to 64% and 
66% in the USA. 
Similarly to the EU, in the USA there is also a decline in growth regarding the 
proportion of exports (2007: 15%; 2008: 11%) and imports (2007: 7%; 2008: 4%) to 
and from the EU. There is still growth, but it is slower than in the years before (WTO, 
2009, p. 17). 
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To provide a general idea of customs in the European Union and in the USA, the 
author will briefly describe the main procedures that cargo has to go through in order to 
legally be exported and imported from or into the country in question. 
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All cargo leaving or arriving in the EU have to be declared to the customs 
authority. Usually, declaration has to be turned in to the customs office at the place of 
presentation of the goods. However, under certain circumstances the economic 
operator may apply for a so-called "single authorization" that enables the operator to 
perform formalities in the member state where he is located. The main benefit of this 
procedure, also referred to as "centralized clearance", is that the operator may use his 
expertise at one site, communicate with only one customs authority and proceed with 
any formalities in only one language (EC, 2010b and EC, 2010c and EC, 2010d). 
Customs declaration shall be prepared by either (EC, 2010b): 
• The goods' owner, or 
• His representative, or 
• The person in control of the goods 
Basically, there are three types of declaration (EC, 2010b): 
• Electronic declaration 
• Manual declaration, using the Single Administrative Document (SAD) 
• Oral declaration (usually by travelers and private consignees with small 
consignments) 
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The main aim for export procedure is to ensure that goods leaving the EU do not 
conflict with export restrictions and that certain export refunds regarding agricultural 
products are granted. In addition, through the export procedures, the EU has the ability 
to monitor trade. 
First of all, the goods have to be declared to the customs authority, as described 
in section 2.3.1, together with the authorization for export or certain licenses, if 
required. The customs office of declaration can be either at the place of packaging or 
at the place of the business' establishment.  
After a positive inspection, the customs authority releases the goods for export. 
When the cargo arrives at the frontier (or port or airport), the customs office of 
exit compares the cargo to the declaration in order to ensure that they are compliant. A 
copy of the SAD is returned to the declarant as proof of actual export (EC, 2010e). 
In addition to the general export procedures, the European Union provides 
additional procedures for certain circumstances in order to ease customs processes: 
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• Outward processing: When a good re-enters the EU after a value 
adding transformation, "duty has to be paid on the value added abroad" 
(EC, 2010f). 
• Customs warehouses: Imported goods may be held in special customs 
warehouses. The importer may either re-export them from the 
Community, or import them from the warehouse into the Community, and 
thus pay duties at a future time. Minimal processing procedures are 
allowed in warehouses (EC, 2010g). 
• Free zones: Exporters lodging their goods in free zones are VAT zero 
rating enabled. Suppliers do not have to be charged VAT. In addition, 
certain other benefits may be applicable that might differ from zone to 
zone. Also, traders benefit from those zones, as they are in a position to 
undertake fewer customs formalities (EC, 2010h). 
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The general aim of import procedures is to ensure that duties are paid and to 
apply commercial policy measures (e.g. quotas) as well as other formalities (e.g. health 
certificates). 
Imports have to be declared as described in section 2.3.1. After the acceptance 
of this declaration, duties have to be paid and the cargo is released for free circulation 
within the Community (EC, 2010i). 
Under certain requirements the EU allows the use of the following tools: 
• Temporary importation: Under certain circumstances, if goods are used 
within the Community and afterwards re-exported to the state of origin, no 
duty or VAT has to be paid (for instance A.T.A. carnet) (EC, 2010j). 
• Inward processing: This may apply for goods that are processed in the 
European Union for re-export. Duty and VAT release for the 
manufacturers within the EU are the aim of this tool (EC, 2010k). 
• Processing under customs control: Imported goods can be "processed 
into products which are subject to a lower duty rate before they are put 
into free circulation (e.g. PVC materials subject to a duty rate of 8.3% may 
be processed into film screens with a duty rate of 2.7%)" (EC, 2010l). 
• Customs warehouses: As described in section 2.3.1.1 above. 
• Free zones: As described in section 2.3.1.1 above. Free zones are 
usually used for importation processes in order to store goods before the 
release for free circulation (EC, 2010m).  
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In the next two sections, the author gives a brief overview of import and export 
regulations and processes in the USA. 
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As soon as cargo reaches the United States, goods have to be declared to U.S. 
CBP. The declarant is the importer of record. This may be (U.S. CBP, 2006c, pp. 11, 
17): 
• The owner of the goods 
• Purchaser of the goods 
• Authorized regular employee of the owner or purchaser 
• Licensed customs broker designated by owner, purchaser or consignee 
Declaration and examination of goods is required in order to (U.S. CBP, 2006c, 
p. 20): 
• Determine value and dutiable status of shipment 
• Determine required marking for goods 
• Filter prohibited articles 
• Check the correctness of invoices and actual quantity of goods 
• Check the shipment for narcotics 
"In most instances, entry is made by a person or firm certified by the carrier 
bringing the goods to the port of entry. This entity (i.e., the person or firm certified) is 
considered the 'owner' of the goods for customs purposes" (U.S. CBP, 2006c, p. 12). 
In the United States of America only customs brokers are entitled to act in 
matters of customs on behalf of the importer. Customs brokers are either private 
persons or companies who have received a license from U.S. CBP (U.S. CBP, 2006c, 
p. 17). 
If entry is done by a foreign corporation, a U.S. resident agent or representative 
is required. Also, the customs bond has to be incorporated in the U.S (U.S. CBP, 
2006c, p. 17).  
In the U.S. the usual process of import (entry for consumption) is as follows (U.S. 
CBP, 2006c, pp. 12-13): 
1. Declaration of goods: In order to release the shipment from the U.S. port 
of arrival, the declarant needs to file the following documents within 15 
calendar days after arrival at the U.S. port of arrival: 
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• Entry Manifest or Application and Special Permit for Immediate Delivery 
• Evidence of right to make entry 
• Commercial invoice (or pro forma invoice in case of unavailability) 
• Packing list 
• Other documents (in certain cases) 
In addition, a customs bond needs to be presented to U.S. CBP in order to 
assure the ability to pay duties, taxes and other charges.  
2. Entry summary documentation: After the analysis of documents U.S. 
CBP may examine the shipment. If U.S. CBP does not find any legal or 
regulatory violations, the shipment is released. At the designated 
customhouse the entry summary documentation is filed and duties are to be 
deposited. 
Additionally, the following entry types are valid (U.S. CBP, 2006c, pp. 11-14): 
• Entry for consumption (as described above), 
• Immediate delivery: Under certain circumstances, U.S. CBP may 
release the shipment immediately after arrival at the port of entry. 
Immediate delivery has to be applied for after leaving the foreign country 
and at least five days prior to arrival in the USA. This form of entry is only 
applicable to the following shipments under certain circumstances: 
o NAFTA merchandise with approval of port director 
o NAFTA fruits and vegetables for human consumption 
o Shipments for U.S. agencies or government officers 
o Fair trade shipments 
o Tariff-rate and absolute quota shipments 
o Shipments released from a warehouse, if within 10 working days a 
withdrawal for consumption occurs 
o Merchandise authorized or entitled by U.S. CBP for immediate 
delivery 
• Entry for warehouse at the port of arrival: In U.S. CBP bonded 
warehouses, this type of entry allows the importer to postpone release of 
the goods and thus payment of duties. Also, the importer can export the 
goods without having to pay duties. In addition, certain manipulation of 
the shipment is allowed that is not regarded as manufacturing. In such a 
case the goods may be exported without paying duties, or imported into 
the U.S. by paying duties on the manipulated value of the goods. 
• In-bond transport to another port of entry for actual entry (U.S. CBP, 
2006c, pp. 16-17): If the importer wishes to enter the goods at a different 
location, the shipment may be transported in a bonded status to that 
location. 
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• Temporary duty-free importation: Under certain circumstances, goods 
may be imported if they will be re-exported within one year (such as ATA 
carnets). Professional equipment, commercial samples and advertising 
material is usually eligible for temporary duty-free importation (U.S. CBP, 
2006c, p. 47). 
• Foreign-trade zones: These zones are legally not included in the 
customs territory of the USA. The main aim is to promote trade and 
commerce. As manipulation and manufacturing is permitted, cost savings 
may occur (U.S. CBP, 2006c, pp. 151-153). 
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In order to protect national security and competitiveness, the Bureau of Industry 
and Security (U.S. BIS) located in the U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. DoC) has 
introduced a Dual-Use Export Control Initiative under the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR). With this initiative the following is ensured (U.S. DoC, 2007a): 
• Validated End Users: Trade with Validated End Users (VEU) is 
facilitated and denied to suspected terrorists and other parties that might 
be involved. 
• U.S. competitiveness: U.S. BIS believes that competitiveness in 
technology and economy are key for national security in the long run.  
• Transparency: The Dual-Use Export Control Initiative has to be 
communicated to the industry. 
An exporter has to determine on his own whether a license is required for the 
actual export of his goods. Generally, only a small amount of exports need a license 
from U.S. BIS. This depends on the goods themselves, the destination of the export, 
the importer of the goods, and the purpose of use by the end user (U.S. DoC, 2007b, 
p. 2). 
Good classification: If the product is on the Commerce Control List (CCL), the 
exporter has to determine the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). Amongst 
others, the CCL includes items such as nuclear and nuclear-related items, chemicals, 
electronics, computers, sensors and propulsion systems. Low-technology items that 
are not part of CCL may fall under EAR and have to be classified as EAR99 (U.S. DoC, 
2007b, pp. 3-5). 
Destination: As soon as the ECCN is known, the exporter has to compare the 
product to the Commerce Country Chart, which gives information on what controls are 
active in the country of export (national security, crime control, etc). This information 
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together with the ECCN entry shows whether an export license is needed or not (U.S. 
DoC, 2007b, pp. 5-6). 
Importer & end-use of item: Even if the goods are not to be licensed for export 
under ECCN, export may still be prohibited. Lists1 have to be taken into account: The 
"Entity List", the "Treasury Department Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons List", "The Unverified List" and the "Denied Persons List". Also, regardless of 
the type of goods, the end-use of it has to be considered. For instance, if one exports 
to "certain entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", an 
export license is required no matter what items are shipped (U.S. DoC, 2007b, p. 7). 
                                                
1
 Lists are available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/ under "Lists to Check". 
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The economy is driven by international trade and thus by the movement of goods 
across national borders. Transportation is especially vulnerable to threats such as 
terrorist attacks. Only one event of that kind could have a massive impact on the 
industry and the economy nationally and worldwide. There is therefore a need to 
secure cargo against terrorist exploitation that might have an immense effect on our 
trade and economy. Therefore one of the major tasks of today’s customs authorities is 
to prevent unforeseeable events of external threats. For this reason it is self-evident 
that issues of cargo security are dealt with by national and international customs 
authorities in the first instance, and then by other international organizations (WCO, 
2007, p. 2). 
This chapter has the aim of presenting cargo security initiatives and relevant 
frameworks by theory. 
In the first section (section 3.1), the reader will get an overview of security 
standards and frameworks. This includes the SAFE Framework by the World Customs 
Organization, which aims to harmonize customs procedures. The ISPS Code by the 
International Maritime Organization is also described. This program represents a 
widely applied security code. 
Section 3.2 gives an overview of security and facilitation initiatives in the 
European Union, describing the AEO and advance notification. 
In section 3.3 the core cargo security initiatives in the USA will be considered 
with a focus on C-TPAT and the U.S. American advance notification system. This 
section, however, will also describe other initiatives that altogether represent the cargo 
security program of the USA. 
After having understood the theoretical aspects of each security program, the 
author will compare the initiatives in section 3.4 and then describe the status quo of 
mutual recognition between the EU and the USA in section 3.5. 
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Worldwide we can find a huge number of different standards that apply for 
transportation and cargo security. Private organizations or intergovernmental 
institutions mostly issue these. The author has selected the two main standards that 
apply for cargo movement between shipments from the European Union to the United 
States of America and vice versa. 
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The World Customs Organization's (WCO) SAFE Framework and the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) are described in the following sections. 
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The World Customs Organization (WCO), being the only independent 
international and intergovernmental organization dealing with customs matters, is one 
of the major parties when it comes to topics of global customs. The WCO focuses on 
“the development of global standards, the simplification and harmonisation of Customs 
procedures, trade supply chain security, the facilitation of international trade, the 
enhancement of Customs enforcement and compliance activities, anti-counterfeiting 
and piracy initiatives, public-private partnerships, integrity promotion, and sustainable 
global Customs capacity building programmes” (WCO, 2010a). Also, the World 
Customs Organization’s mission is to contribute to a more effective flow of goods in a 
global world amongst its members, developing standards such as the SAFE 
framework, building up networks, stimulating cooperation and fostering collaboration 
between customs authorities and border regulatory agencies, businesses and 
governments (WCO, 2009, pp. 2-3). 
As we have heard earlier, it essential to enhance compliance, thus improving 
security, and to improve the flow of goods though borders. With the WCO SAFE 
framework the organization’s aim is to ensure better security and a faster flow of goods 
at the same time. This can be achieved best if authorities all over the world can rely on 
a standard that is mutually recognized by customs authorities and is not contradicting 
or duplicating national customs practices. Some aspects of the SAFE framework 
require capacity building. Therefore the WCO SAFE framework also incorporates 
assistance for customs authorities when it comes to building up capacities (WCO, 
2007, p. 2). 
One of the main strengths of the WCO SAFE framework is the range of the 
organization. With 176 customs administrations on board, the members of the WCO 
process approximately 98 percent of world trade altogether. Moreover, not only 
authorities but also businesses and all modes of transportation are being accounted for 
(WCO, 2010b and Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 19). 
As implementation of standards such as the SAFE framework, representing a 
minimum set of standards, cannot be done by immediate action, nations are able to 
implement it phase-by-phase according to bottlenecks in capacity and legislation. 
However, they have to report a timetable to the WCO, build up capacity that is needed 
for the implementation and equipment and in addition periodically report to the WCO, 
amongst others (WCO, 2007, pp. 4, 57-58). 
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By making use of the SAFE framework, three parties benefit from the standard. 
Firstly, nations benefit through more secure trade, leading to economic development 
and growth. According to the WCO the application results in social and economic 
protection and encourages foreign direct investments (FDI). Secondly, customs 
authorities benefit from the building up of customs-to-customs networks that again 
enable the flow of crucial information in a faster and more accurate way. On the one 
hand this leads to a better and more effective risk management, and on the other more 
resources can be allocated to development and other critical actions. Also, through the 
network customs, authorities should experience knowledge transfer and a better view 
of a global supply chain – thus eliminating duplicate reporting requirements. Thirdly, 
businesses should also profit from the SAFE framework, as goods are moved faster 
and more securely through borders from the seller to the buyer without the need for 
multiple reporting, for instance (WCO, 2007, pp. 5-6). 
The four core elements of the framework are harmonization of advance cargo 
information for transit, outbound and inbound shipments; employment of an adequate 
risk management system; guarantee of benefits for businesses that meet certain 
standards and best practices; and the requirement of inspection of high-risk containers 
by the sending nation’s authorities, if requested by the receiving nation’s customs 
administration after employing risk targeting methodology. (WCO, 2007, p. 3) 
The previously mentioned elements rest on a two-pillar-system of the SAFE 
framework. To best achieve smooth transport of goods over boundaries, the two pillars 
– business-to-customs partnerships and customs-to-customs networks – allow the 
setting of standards which are easy to understand and relatively easy to implement 
(WCO, 2007, p. 3). 
Figure 4 shows a schematic overview of the SAFE framework, with the four core 
elements and two pillars that were discussed above. 
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Figure 4: The SAFE framework 
(Source: own creation after WCO, 2007, p. 3) 
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The first pillar, customs-to-customs, focuses mainly on electronic advance 
information and risk allocation before arrival of cargo at the destination port. The table 
below shows a brief overview of the standards for customs-to-customs networks. 
Name of Standard Brief Description 
 
Integrated Supply Chain 
Management 
According to WCO ISCM Guidelines 
Cargo Inspection Authority Customs administration legally entitled to inspect 
cargo arriving, departing and transferring 
Modern Technology in 
Inspection Equipment 
High-tech equipment to screen high-risk containers 
and cargo non-intrusively 
Risk Management Systems Identification by automated risk assessment 
High-Risk Cargo or Container Definition of high-risk cargo and containers 
Advance Electronic Information Requirement in order to assess risk 
Targeting and Communication Standardization of targeting criteria and 
communication systems 
Performance Measures Creation of statistical reports 
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Security Assessments Cooperation with other competent authorities 
Employee Integrity Anti-breach programs 
Outbound Security Inspections If requested by importing country, outbound cargo 
is to be inspected 
Table 3: SAFE framework customs-to-customs standards 
(Source: own creation after WCO, 2007, pp. 7-25) 
The process, responsibilities, rights, duties and conventions of seal integrity for 
secured containers are also described by the SAFE framework (WCO, 2007, pp. 25-
28). 
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The second, customs-to-business pillar’s aim is to build up partnerships between 
private companies and customs administration, in order to relieve risk management 
systems and push more security into the private sector. The main idea is to identify 
low-risk business and grant benefits. Companies have to comply with certain standards 
and criteria in order to receive the status of a low-risk firm. Not only the companies 
should benefit from speedier processing, prioritization and security efficiencies but also 
from other resulting opportunities such as lower costs in the supply chain, better 
reputation and thus business opportunities, and better information flow between the 
organization and the customs authority (WCO, 2007, pp. 29-30). The main 
requirements and standards for customs-to-business partnerships are listed in Table 4 
below: 
Name of Standard Brief Description 
 
Partnership Determination of standards; self-assessment 
Security Incorporation of standards and best practices 
Authorization Validation process by customs authority 
Technology Use of modern technology 
Communication Updated customs-to-business partnership 
standards 
Facilitation Actual cooperation between businesses and 
customs authorities 
Table 4: SAFE framework customs-to-business standards 
(Source: own creation after WCO, 2007, pp. 30-34) 
The SAFE framework also defines which conditions, requirements and benefits 
should apply for the cooperation of the customs administration with any indentified low-
risk company (also referred to as Authorized Economic Operator, AEO) (WCO, 2007, 
pp. 34-56). By definition, in the WCO framework an AEO is “a party involved in the 
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international movement of goods in whatever function that has been approved by or on 
behalf of a national Customs administration as complying with WCO or equivalent 
supply chain security standards. Authorized Economic Operators include inter alia 
manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidators, intermediaries, 
ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, distributors” 
(WCO, 2007, p. 36). 
The main elements of SAFE framework’s AEO program are briefly described 
below (WCO, 2007, pp. 37-48): 
1. Demonstrated compliance with customs requirements 
It is required for the customs authority to take into consideration the 
prospective company’s history of compliance. 
2. Satisfactory system for management of commercial records 
As commercial records play a crucial role in security, the AEO should be 
in a position to maintain accurate and timely import and export reports. 
3. Financial viability 
In order to be able to fulfill and improve security measures within the 
organization, financial viability is highly important. 
4. Consultation, cooperation and communication 
Customs authorities and AEOs should consult on a regular basis and 
discuss matters of interest. 
5. Education, training and awareness 
Personnel training programs of customs authorities and AEOs are 
required in order to keep human resources up to date. 
6. Information exchange, access and confidentiality 
A secure communication system is to be used and/or developed by 
customs authorities and AEOs, so that sensitive data is not subject to 
misuse or unauthorized access. 
7. Cargo security 
In order to allow the highest possible level of cargo security, customs 
authorities and AEOs should ensure integrity of shipments and implement 
access systems. In addition the creation of routine processes is required. 
8. Conveyance security 
If requirements for the security of conveyance do not exist, customs 
authorities and AEOs should establish effective control regimes. 
9. Premises security 
Customs authorities should establish a set of standards for controlling and 
monitoring required areas that have to be applied by AEOs. 
10. Personnel security 
As far as law allows, customs authorities and AEOs should review the 
background information of future employees. Also unauthorized access 
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should be prohibited to facilities, shipments and any other areas where 
manipulation could occur. 
11. Trading partner security 
Customs authorities have to establish certain requirements for AEOs in 
order for the latter to choose partners of low risk. 
12. Crisis management and incident recovery 
Both customs authorities and AEOs have to implement a crisis 
management that allows immediate actions in unexpected situations of 
any kind of disaster including terrorist attacks. Also, a program of 
recovery should be worked out. 
13. Measurement, analyses and improvement 
Both the customs authority and the AEO should implement processes for 
monitoring, and thus to evaluate compliance with, the WCO guidelines for 
AEOs, to ensure suitability of the security management system and to 
recognize areas for improvement of security (WCO, 2007, pp. 37-48). 
Additionally, the SAFE framework gives an explanatory list of benefits that could 
be granted to AEOs. Benefits offered “should be meaningful, measurable and 
reportable”. The list of benefits can be divided into four main categories that again are 
broken down into actual types of benefits. The four categories are as follows (WCO, 
2007, pp. 49-50): 
• Faster cargo release, shorter transit time and lower costs of storage 
• Access to valuable information for AEO members 
• Priority in the event of trade disruptions and elevated threat level 
• Facilitation of other cargo processing initiatives 
The SAFE framework also includes guidelines on the AEO validation process 
that will not be further discussed in this thesis (WCO, 2007, pp. 50-54). 
More importantly, the SAFE framework also deals with the mutual recognition of 
AEOs. It describes that members of the WCO that have the intention of making use of 
the framework have to work together and implement mechanisms in order to mutually 
recognize each other’s AEOs and thus minimize redundant efforts. That means that not 
only the same standards have to be implemented by customs authorities but also that 
those standards have to be applied uniformly. The legal system should also allow 
mutual recognition (WCO, 2007, pp. 54-56). 
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The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has introduced the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in order to enhance security in maritime 
transportation worldwide after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (IMO, 2002a).  
The main aim of ISPS is to create a standardized, stable framework of risk 
evaluation, in order to allow governments to "offset changes in threat with changes in 
vulnerability for ships and port facilities" (IMO, 2002b). According to ISPS the only way 
to defeat threats is to reduce vulnerability. 
The ISPS is part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), so it is obligatory for 148 SOLAS contracting parties2 to follow it. However, 
countries that are IMO members but not included in SOLAS do not have to comply with 
ISPS (IMO, 2002a). 
Mainly, the Code focuses on security-related requirements for governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies and represents a framework. It consists of two 
parts: The first part (Part A) describes mandatory requirements, whereas the second 
part (Part B) describes guidelines for the application of these requirements. As the 
ISPS is a framework but not an actual description of security measures, contracting 
governments have to assess risks in the first place. This consists of the following steps 
(IMO, 2002b): 
• Evaluation of critical assets: Critical assets of port authorities, which 
can cause significant damage to the port's economy or environment, or 
may cause loss of life. 
• Identification of actual threats: Threats that might harm critical assets 
are to be identified and rated for prioritization of security measures. 
• Assessment of vulnerability of each port: Weaknesses in "physical 
security, structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, 
communications systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other 
areas" (IMO, 2002b) are being identified. 
• Risk evaluation based on assessments described above. 
Additionally the ISPS Code requires further minimum measures for ships and 
ports such as (IMO, 2002b and Bennett, 2008, pp. 166-169): 
• Security plans 
• Security officer 
                                                
2
 A list of SOLAS contracting parties can be found under 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248. 
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• Certain equipment 
• Monitoring and controlling access 
• Monitoring the activities of people and cargo 
• Ensuring security communications are readily available 
• Company security officer (shipping companies only) 
The current level of threat is being communicated through threat levels (1: 
normal; 2: medium; 3: high) defined by the contracting government. Ships and port 
facilities both have security officers, who are in charge of complying with the security 
plan. These security plans state which security measures have to be taken in order to 
operate at threat level 1, i.e. in normal operation mode. However, if the ship or port 
facility is announced to be under threat level 2, the security plan explains further 
procedures and additional measures to be taken in order to operate in that intensified 
level of risk. Preparatory actions for operation under and reaction to risk level 3 are 
also part of this security plan.  
Responsibilities of the contracting government include setting the threat level, 
approval of security plans and amendments, verification of compliance, issuing the 
ISPS certificate and communication with the International Maritime Organization as 
well as the industries of concern (IMO, 2002b).  
According to Austen (2007, pp. 69-72), ports have not become more secure than 
before the implementation of ISPS. Cargo insurance companies have not reported a 
reduction in cargo theft claims after the introduction of ISPS. Austen's opinion is that 
ports might not be more secure against terrorism if the measures of ISPS have not 
even succeeded in decreasing theft at port facilities. 
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The most ambitious and important effort of the European Union (EU) to 
strengthen supply chain security is the amendment of the Community Customs Code. 
This modification is to be found in the European Commission’s (EC) Regulation No. 
648/2005 (EC, 2009a), according to which risk to the community as well as its citizens 
and economic operators should be reduced. This is to be done by achieving a mutual 
level of security across the member states’ customs authorities. Therefore the 
European Commission shall create a framework for risk management for all member 
states. This regulation promotes the introduction of two core elements (EC, 2005): 
• Mutual information system (advance notification) 
• Authorised Economic Operator (AEO)3 
These main components will be described in the following sections of this thesis, 
in order to understand the main principles, applications, benefits and challenges of the 
systems mentioned. 
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One of the most important components of European Union’s (EU) modified 
Community Customs Code is the so-called Authorised Economic Operator (AEO). Its 
aim is to grant economic operators the status of a low-risk, more trusted actor under 
certain circumstances when it comes to actions with customs authorities within the EU. 
It is therefore required that the authorized operator fulfils requirements set by the 
customs authority (EC, 2009a). There are three different types of certification, based 
on which alleviation is preferred by the economic operator, namely AEO-C, AEO-S and 
AEO-F (EC, 2009a). These will be discussed in sections 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.3 below. 
Once an economic operator is AEO-certified in one member state of the EU, the 
certification is to be automatically recognized in any other member state. However, 
customs facilitation does not necessarily have to be granted by the other member state 
if certain criteria set by the latter are not complied with (Swedish National Board of 
Trade, 2008, p. 51). 
                                                
3
 For AEO the EU uses British English orthography (Authorised Economic Operator). In contrast, the WCO 
uses American English (Authorized Economic Operator). The difference in orthography reflects which 
AEO the content refers to. 
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Any member state of the EU is authorized to approve AEO membership to any 
economic operator if certain requirements are fulfilled (EC, 2009a). 
When developing the AEO concept in the EU, standards such as the SAFE 
framework by the WCO4, ISO/PAS 28001 and other existing standards were 
considered in order to allow compatibility. Most importantly, the AEO is based on the 
SAFE framework in order to ensure mutual recognition globally. In order to allow wide 
and efficient recognition and implementation inside the EU, several commissions that 
are dealing with different modes of transport were consulted (EC, 2007a, p. 7). 
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Any economic operator can apply for AEO status. An economic operator is 
described by the corresponding law as “a person who, in the course of his business, is 
involved in activities covered by customs legislation” (EC, 2006a, p. 66).  
However, the term “involved” is not restricted to being directly involved in 
activities covered by customs authorities. Even a manufacturer whose products are 
exported by a third company, and thus whose export formalities are dealt with by this 
third company, can apply for AEO status. In contrast, a supplier of raw materials that 
deals with goods in free circulation within the European Union cannot be considered as 
an economic operator according to the definition described above. An operator 
applying for AEO status does not necessarily have to actually handle the goods. Only if 
he deals with the data related to the goods in question may he be eligible for AEO 
“Security and Safety” (AEO-S) certification. In addition, the AEO program of the EU 
tries to involve all members of the supply chain and secure supply chain management 
amongst all players (EC, 2007a, p. 8). 
In general, applicants should turn to an “AEO competent customs authority”5 
(EC, 2009a). 
The customs authority that an economic operator should turn to apply depends 
on the member state’s regulation. In Austria, for instance, the competent customs 
authority is the one corresponding to the economic operator’s registered office 
(Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2010). The same applies in Germany (German 
Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009b). In contrast, in the United Kingdom economic 
operators are required to send their applications to one particular office of Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) that has been established for AEO 
                                                
4
 Discussed in section 3.1.1. 
5
 A list of AEO-competent customs authorities is to be found under: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds/cgi-bin/aeocsrdccaquery?Lang=EN. 
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especially (HMRC, 2006). All of these member states have in common that application 
is provided and preferred electronically. 
The authorization process consists of several stages. Some of them are carried 
out by the customs authority (CA), and others by the economic operator (EO). In 
addition, some authorization processes have to be carried out by both CA and EO in 
cooperation. For explanatory purposes the regulations in one member state, namely 
Austria, are presented: 
Authorization Process Performed By Referring Paragraph6 
Preliminary talk CA7 and EO8 3.2 
Application EO 3.3 
Self-Assessment EO 3.4 
Risk analysis CA 3.7 (especially 3.7.9) 
Pre-Audit CA and EO 3.7.10 
Certification CA 3.9.3 
Monitoring CA (and EO)  
Table 5: AEO authorization process 
(Source: own creation after Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009 and EC, 2006b, p. 15) 
To better understand the processes mentioned above, a more detailed 
description of Table 5 is provided below (Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009): 
Preliminary talk: The preliminary talk refers to a general session between the 
applicant and the customs authority in order to discuss details and application 
procedure. This should help both sides to clearly understand formalities and timeline in 
order to collaborate more efficiently during the whole process. 
Application: An application form has to be completed both electronically and in 
printed version9 and sent to the customs authority with further attachments. 
Self-assessment: Self-assessment is not mandatory but can be attached to the 
application (electronically). The structure of self-assessment is to be found in the 
appendix, in section A. The structured self-assessment should help companies better 
understand their security level and compliance. Furthermore it can speed up the 
authorization process as it contains extensive data for the customs authority.  
Risk analysis: In this step the customs authorization will assess the applicant for 
sources of risk and level of risk management. The customs authorization has to use 
                                                
6
 Corresponds to Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance. (2009). Regulation GZ-BMF-010313/0141-
IV/6/2009. 
7
 Customs authority. 
8
 Economic operator. 
9
 This refers to Austrian AEO, for legal reasons. 
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the COMPACT model introduced by the European Union that will be explained in 
section 3.2.1.2 below. 
Pre-audit: After having conducted the risk analysis, the customs authority will 
make a pre-audit on site. The applicant’s facilities are visited and assessed with the 
aim of ensuring general compliance. Amongst others, spot-checks of the declaration, 
joint risk mapping, random checks of documents and the evaluation of processes and 
security can be conducted. 
Certification: After the customs authorization has been granted, the certificate is 
issued. 
Monitoring: In order to ensure that risk management and security measures in 
the AEO-certified company do not diminish over time, a client coordinator has to 
monitor AEOs by reviewing company data and trade patterns. Evaluation audits are 
also permitted (EC, 2006b, p. 15). 
Requirements for AEO status are dependent on the type of AEO certificate the 
economic operator is willing to apply for. In Table 6 the criteria and the corresponding 
AEO status can be seen. As one can see, every applicant has to generally comply with 
customs regulations heretofore, have a satisfactory accounting system and verified 
liquidity. However, AEO-S and AEO-F applicants, in addition, have to present 
implemented corresponding security standards. 
Criteria AEO-C AEO-S AEO-F 
Appropriate compliance with customs regulations 
heretofore 
x x x 
Satisfactory accounting system x x x 
Verifiable liquidity x x x 
Appropriate security standards  x x 
Table 6: Criteria against AEO certification type 
(Source: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009, p. 2.4.3) 
The customs authority uses a certain set of data for audition. It is important that 
data already available about the company applying should be used in order to make 
audits more efficient. Therefore customs authorities are entitled to use previously 
collected information about the applicant such as follows (EC, 2007a, p. 9): 
• “Information gathered when economic operators have applied for customs 
authorisations; 
• Information from customs audits; […] 
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• Information contained in the customs’ computerised systems about the 
daily use of customs procedures by the economic operator”; and 
• Information that has been processed by customs authorities at the time of 
the so-called simplified procedure authorization.10 
To better understand the actual criteria that were mentioned very generally in 
Table 6, the actual understanding of these will be described briefly from the customs 
authorities’ point of view11 (Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2009, p. 3.8): 
Appropriate compliance with customs regulations heretofore: Not only the 
applicant (natural person or alliance) but also the chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
person in charge of customs activities will be investigated. 
Satisfactory accounting system: One can assume a satisfactory accounting 
system if the economic operator did not receive a notice of complaint within the last 
three years. Furthermore, if a recently conducted audit reports no claims in the 
accounting system, it can be supposed that the economic operator complies with this 
criterion. 
Verifiable liquidity: Firstly, records of the customs authority are reviewed as to 
whether the economic operator had difficulties regarding customs payments. Secondly, 
ratings of organizations providing financial information about companies and 
individuals, such as KSV187012 or Dun & Bradstreet (D&B),13 are taken into account. 
The guide value for ratings is to be found in Table 7. The customs authority is in the 
position to judge liquidity of the economic operator even if it does not meet the rating 
presented in the table discussed (Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
Organization 
 
 Rating/Score 
KSV1870 (KSV Rating) Existing companies 399 and below 
 New companies 350 and below 
D&B (D&B Score)  50 and above or 
  Average score of industry and above 
Table 7: Guide values for financial rating 
(Source: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, 2010, p. 3.8.3) 
                                                
10
 For further information on simplified procedure authorization please refer to: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/procedural_aspects/general/centralised_clearance/index_
en.htm. 
11
 Refers to the Austrian customs authority. 
12
 For further information see http//www.ksv.at/. 
13
 For further information see ttp://www.dnb.com/. 
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Appropriate security standards14: The economic operator is required to have a 
tool for assessment of his business partners. AEO membership, reliability and security 
of the business partner have to be criteria for choice to ensure security amongst the 
whole (international) supply chain. Shortcomings in meeting the requirements have to 
be documented. Furthermore, measures for physical security have to be met according 
to the size of the operator. This includes access controls, personnel security and 
surveillance amongst others. 
A company is considered to comply with customs requirements as soon as the 
company in question and all shareholders meet criteria regarding customs and 
financial viability for three years prior to the application. If a company has existed for 
less than three years, customs authorities can use data from their time of existence 
(Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 52). 
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The AEO COMPACT model was developed by the European Commission in 
order to give both customs authorities and businesses a guideline for method of risk 
mapping and assessment. The COMPACT model has been developed in a general 
way in order to allow a broad application. It is not only applicable for customs matters 
but also for supply chain security universally (EC, 2006b, pp. 2-3, 6). 
The graphically visualized model can be found in the appendix, in section B. 
According to the European Commission (2006b, p. 9), risk mapping is defined by 
the following five elementary processes: 
1. Understanding the business (of an operator) 
2. Clarify the customs’ objectives 
3. Identify risks (which risk might influence the customs’ objectives?) 
4. Assess risk (which risks are the most significant?) 
5. Respond to risks; what to do about the (remaining) risks. 
                                                
14
 Only for applicants of AEOS and AEOF certificates. 
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Figure 5: AEO COMPACT model 
(Source: EC, 2006b, p. 6) 
In order to give a brief overview of the COMPACT model, the author summarizes 
the five basic elements of the model listed above. 
Understanding the business: According to the model it is highly important to 
know the business, which is applying for AEO status. In particular the processes within 
the operator and the environment are to be assessed. Two different types of data are 
distinguished between in order to obtain a clear view about the operator:  Internal 
sources (such as “VAT or other information from the tax services; Intrastat databases; 
information gathered in the past through customs import and/or export systems; 
previous audit reports; records on customs authorizations and intelligence databases” 
(EC, 2006b, p. 7)) and external sources (such as data from “Chambers of Commerce, 
Statistics, published annual reports, the operator’ website and […] information from the 
operator himself” (EC, 2006b, p. 7)). Also interviews and “search[es] for documented 
proof in the operator’s administration” are suggested (EC, 2006b, p. 7). 
Clarify the objectives: This step is held very generally in the COMPACT model. 
The relevance of risks has to be assessed with regard to the customs organizations’ 
objectives and the facilitation and certification the operator is applying for. The 
objectives are suggested to be prepared by the customs authority’s teams of 
specialists that could work together with the applicant (EC, 2006b, p. 8). 
Identify risks: As soon as the objectives are clarified, the customs authority can 
assess which potential risks for the operator might apply. This may require interaction 
with the operator so the customs authority can draw a picture of the company’s risk 
management system. According to the COMPACT model, potential risks are 
generalized. They include theoretical occurrences that might have a negative effect on 
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financial interests, on security, safety or “the correct application of Community [or] 
national measures” (EC, 2006b, p. 9). 
Assess risks: Risks applying to the applicant’s operation are prioritized 
according to the likelihood of their occurrence on the one hand and their impact on the 
other hand. Risk-covering measures by the applicant are also taken into account at this 
stage (EC, 2006b, pp. 10-12). 
Respond to risks: The AEO status can only be granted to the applicant if 
theoretically all potential risks applying to the operator’s business can be covered. The 
operator must have measures set up to avoid risks. However, as risks do appear in 
business on a daily basis, remaining risks have to be dealt with. They have to be taken 
(to a certain amount), treated (diminished), transferred (to another party) or terminated 
(by rejecting the application) (EC, 2006b, pp. 12-13). 
#"!"$"# 8545=7*0+(=+<%>+.5)*7=7B3*7(4+
As mentioned previously there are three different types of possible AEO 
certifications: 
• AEO Certificate/Customs Simplifications (AEO-C) 
• AEO Certificate/Security and Safety (AEO-S) 
• AEO Certificate/Customs Simplifications and Security and Safety (AEO-F) 
Based on the requirements an organization fulfils, the customs authority grants 
one of these certificates: 
Type of Certificate Requirements/Criteria 
AEO-C Customs compliance 
Appropriate record-keeping standards 
Financial solvency 
AEO-S Customs compliance 
Appropriate record-keeping standards 
Financial solvency 
Maintenance of appropriate security and safety standards 
AEO-F Customs compliance 
Appropriate record-keeping standards 
Financial solvency 
Maintenance of appropriate security and safety standards 
Will to profit from all benefits offered by AEO 
Table 8: AEO requirements 
(Source: EC, 2007a, pp. 7-8) 
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 The table below summarizes the benefits emerging from different types of AEO 
certification. As one can see, physical and document-based controls, priority treatment 
of consignments and choice of place for inspection are granted to every AEO member. 
Customs simplifications are being granted to AEO-C holders, and simplified summary 
declarations and prior notifications to AEO-S holders. AEO-F holders, on the other 
hand, profit from all types of benefits: 
Type of Benefit AEO-C AEO-S AEO-F 
Fewer physical and document-based controls x x x 
Priority treatment of consignments if selected for 
control 
x x x 
Choice of the place of controls x x x 
Easier admittance to customs simplifications x  x 
Reduced datasets for summary declarations  x x 
Prior notification  x x 
Indirect benefits x x x 
Improved relations to customs x x x 
Recognized as a secure and safe business partner x x x 
Mutual recognition x x x 
Table 9: AEO benefits against AEO type 
(Source: own creation after: EC, 2007a, pp. 14-17) 
According to the author, the last four types of benefits in Table 9 are “soft” 
benefits, as they are not actual benefits granted in the core processes of customs 
authorities but rather side-effects that come with any type of certification. However, in 
the guideline they are listed equivalently with all other core benefits. 
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A very important, yet complex vision of the European Union is the Electronic 
Customs Decision15, which aims to implement the electronic customs initiative (E-
Customs). The electronic multi-annual strategic plan (MASP)16 sets down a road plan, 
the vision and current state of development and also provides a framework and basis 
for implementation and programming of the project (EC, 2008, pp. 4-5). 
                                                
15 Decision No. 70/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on a  
paperless environment for customs and trade, OJ 2008, No L 23, p. 21. 
16
 MASP 2008 (version 9) as of 29/JUL/2010 available. MASP 2010 (version 10) not officially released by 
29/JUL/2010. 
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The E-Customs should provide an integrated, secure and compatible 
communication network between authorities (including back and front offices) to 
process and exchange data about the private sector across borders. The purpose of 
this project is to "facilitate end-to-end supply chain logistics and customs processes for 
the movement of goods into and out of the European Community, and to reduce the 
risks of threats to the safety and security of citizens by minimising the remaining 
differences between Member States' customs processes" (EC, 2008, p. 5). 
Figure 6 below shows MASP's staged approach of E-Customs in the European 
Union including the structure and an approximate road plan of implementation. 
 
 
Figure 6: MASP's vision of E-Customs in the EU 
(Source: EC, 2008, p. 7) 
As one can see, interestingly, the European Union has introduced a triple system 
for advance notification. Not only inbound and goods and cargo in transit are to be 
declared electronically in the so-called Import Control System (ICS) and New 
Comuterised Transit System (NCTS), but there is also a (future) requirement to record 
outbound cargo (Export Control System; ECS). 
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Import Control System (ICS) is a part of the Automated Import System (AIS), 
whereas Export Control System (ECS) is a part of the Automated Export System 
(AES). Both AIS and AES have not yet been implemented fully in the European Union. 
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The core part of the European Union’s customs security program is the Import 
Control System (ICS). It will come into force on January 1, 2011 after a delay of 18 
months. The main aim of this program is to perform risk analysis before the arrival of 
cargo into the European Union’s territory. The main focus is the security of the Union 
and citizens rather than tariff controls, but also other threats such as piracy should be 
defeated and consumerism strengthened (Herzig, 2010b). 
The ICS consists of three interconnected domains in order to ensure 
communication between the main parties involved (EC, 2009b, p. 13): 
1. Common domain: For communication between customs authorities of 
the member states and the European Commission 
2. National domain: For national communication between authorities 
including risk-management 
3. External domain: For communication between the economic operators 
and national customs authorities. 
 
Figure 7: Import Control System architecture 
(Source: EC, 2008, p. 12) 
In order to declare cargo imported to the EU, an Entry Summary Declaration 
(ENS) has to be submitted (Herzig, 2010b). This data is entered into the external 
domain (EC, 2009b, p. 6).  
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The time limits set by the European Union are presented in Table 10 below. 
Mode of Transportation 
 
Time Limit 
Maritime cargo (container) 24 hours prior to loading 
Maritime cargo (bulk) 4 hours prior to arrival 
Short sea shipping17 2 hours prior to arrival 
Short haul flights (< 4 hrs) Actual take-off 
Long haul flights (> 4 hrs) 4 hours prior to arrival 
Rail and inland waterway 2 hours prior to arrival 
Road traffic 1 hour prior to arrival 
Combined traffic Time limit for means of transport entering the EU 
(truck on rail ! time limit for rail) 
Table 10: Time limits for Entry Summary Declarations (ENS) 
(Source: EC, 2009b, pp. 8-9 and Herzig, 2010b) 
As Table 10 shows, the time limit for containerized maritime cargo is the longest, 
at 24 hours prior to loading. 
A list of exceptions from the mandatory filing of ENS includes electricity, goods 
transported via pipelines, personal luggage, postal mail and goods with a value under 
22 EUR (Herzig, 2010b). 
The set of data to be declared depends on the mode of transportation and can be 
found in Table 11 below. As one can clearly see, 13 elements have to be reported with 
all means of transport (sea, air and road), but there are two additional records for 
shipments by sea, namely address of registration and marks and numbers of shipment. 
Data 
 
Sea Air Road 
Unique Consignment Reference Number (UCR) x x x 
Number of freight document18 x x x 
EORI number of person declaring x x x 
EORI number of carrier19 x x x 
Address of registration20 x   
Number of shipment x x x 
Code of first place of arrival x x x 
Date and time of entry at first place of arrival x x x 
                                                
17
 Refers to shipping between certain countries and the EU with exceptions. For further information please 
refer to European Commission (2009b, pp 7-8). 
18
 Alternatively to UCR, if not known. 
19
 If carrier is not party declaring. 
20
 Person to be notified upon arrival of cargo (if known by person declaring). 
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Codes of transit countries x x x 
Code of place of unloading x x x 
Marks and numbers of shipment x   
Container number x x x 
UNDG (UN number for hazardous goods) x x x 
Cost of shipment and code of payment x x x 
Code for special circumstances21 x x x 
Table 11: Entry Summary Declaration (ENS) data to be submitted dependent on 
mode of transportation 
(Source: Herzig, 2010b) 
After the ENS has been transmitted to the ICS, the customs authority returns the 
Movement Reference Number (MRN) to the person declaring. No printout will be 
provided. The customs authority of reception then undertakes a risk-analysis based on 
the ENS and decides whether a do-no-load (DNL) message is transmitted to the carrier 
or inspection has to be conducted by the customs authority of destination (Herzig, 
2010c). 
An ENS can even be modified as long as the customs authority has (Herzig, 
2010c): 
• Not yet decided to physically inspect the cargo of question 
• Not detected incorrect declaration 
• Released the cargo 
By EU law there are currently no penalties and fines defined, however member 
states are allowed to impose them individually. The customs authority of Germany for 
instance had enormous warehouses built for cargo arriving with late or no ENS. This 
might lead to storage costs being levied (Herzig, 2010c). 
#"!"!"! G5H+.(-'/*5)705;+?)3407*+CD0*5-+EG.?CF+34;+G.?C1?,9+
The New Computerised Transit System's (NCTS) core aim was to computerize 
the transit system. It should be in a position to control and manage transits in the 
European Union. Through the interconnected computer system a more efficient system 
for declarations has been established (EC, 2001, p. 12). 
Objectives of NCTS include (EC, 2001, p. 12): 
• More effective and efficient transit system 
                                                
21
 AEO status amongst others. 
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• Improved fraud prevention and detection 
• Faster and more secure transactions 
All common and Community transits in the EU have had to be declared 
electronically since July 2005 through the NCTS (EC, 2008, p. 13). 
An update to the NCTS was the introduction called NCTS-TIR, which required all 
Carnet TIR transactions to be declared electronically from January 2009 in all member 
states of the European Union. However, the paper-based declaration still has to be 
made as well, because the electronic system only operates within the EU (Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Finance, 2008). 
Another addition will be introduced in NCTS phase 4 with a safety and security 
component (EC, 2008, p. 13). 
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The European Union has also introduced the concept of an Export Control 
System (ECS)/Automated Export System (AES) with the main aim of allowing export 
operations to begin in one and proceed or be finalized in another member state 
through an interconnected communication system. This is to be used by operators, 
customs authorities and governmental institutions. A road plan of three phases 
characterizes the project as follows (EC, 2009c): 
• ECS phase 1: The paper return of export declaration is replaced by ECS. 
The computerized system should serve as a fiscal control system 
between customs offices of exit and export. This is extremely important 
where more member states are involved in the process. Full availability 
since July 2007. 
• ECS phase 2: Builds fully on phase 1 and requires additional data in 
order to ensure security and safety. 
• AES phase 3: In addition to phase 1 and 2, a central clearance is being 
introduced and represents full deployment of the system. 
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The United States of America is a very important player when it comes to cargo 
security. This has to do with a very strong importing/exporting economy as well as the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, which forced authorities in the USA to reconsider existing laws 
and security systems. A large number of programs exist in the USA. Many programs 
have been developed for the NAFTA region, which this thesis does not deal with. The 
author will focus on C-TPAT (section 3.3.3) and the Advance Manifest System in the 
USA (section 3.3.4). Also other initiatives that have an impact on trade between the 
USA and EU will be dealt with. These include the Container Security Initiative and the 
Secure Freight Initiative. 
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The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also referred to as MTSA) can 
be seen as the counterpart to the ISPS Code. Like ISPS, it has been driven by the 
events of 9/11. The main provisions include the following (Bennett, 2008, p. 173): 
• Vulnerability assessments of facilities and vessels  
• National, area, vessel and facility security plans  
• Biometric security cards  
• Maritime Safety and Security Teams  
• Maritime security grant program  
• Foreign port assessment program  
• Automatic Identification Systems  
• Regional Maritime Security Advisory Committees  
The MTSA can be seen as a framework on the basis of which other programs 
have been developed. One of these is the Security and Accountability for Every Port 
Act (commonly known as SAFE Port Act), which is described in the following section 
(Bennett, 2008, p. 173). 
The Code also attempts to align with SOLAS and ISPS where appropriate. 
Therefore the content and the structure are similar to the international standards; the 
MTSA however offers more details (Bennett, 2008, p. 174). Interestingly, the range of 
the MTSA excels the domain of ISPS. For instance, smaller foreign cargo ships 
entering the U.S. are also subject to the MTSA. Ports that do not serve international 
ships covered by the ISPS Code are also subject to rulings, similar to the IMO's 
framework (Bennett, 2008, p. 174). 
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In addition to the differences to ISPS, MTSA also lays down control measures for 
facilities that do not comply with it (Bennett, 2008, p. 175): 
• Restriction on facility access 
• Conditions on operations 
• Suspension of operations 
• Lesser administrative or corrective measures 
• Suspension or revocation of the facility security plan approval  
The results of MTSA can be measured too: A port in New Jersey, USA has 
reported a decrease in theft losses of approximately 30% (Bennett, 2008, p. 177). 
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In October 2006 the Security and Accountability of Every Port Act (SAFE Port 
Act) was introduced in order to amend and add to the MTSA 2002 framework. It has 
the aim of creating initiatives beyond the MTSA's original provisions. As a result, the 
SAFE Port Act has codified and established (Bennett, 2008, p. 173): 
• Container Security Initiative (CSI) by U.S.CBP 
• Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) by U.S. CBP 
• Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 
• Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
• Introduction of 100% radiation scanning of all containers 
• Requirement of additional data for container screening by U.S. CBP 
In the following sections the author will describe measures and programs that are 
part of the SAFE Port Act, such as C-TPAT, CSI and data collection by U.S. CBP and 
others. 
G>G>G 6<%&,2%^4'(0/!?('&+/'%C8Q!(1(8+%&!4/'','8%2!
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT) was the first measure in reaction to the 
terrorist attacks of September 9, 2001 introduced by 
the United States Customs and Border Protection 
(U.S. CBP). Figure 8 illustrates the logo of the 
program. The U.S. customs authority managed to 
implement the program by November 2001 in order to eliminate further terrorist threats. 
The highest security against terrorism can only be granted if an authority can prevent 
terrorists’ tools and weapons of mass destruction from crossing a nation's borders 
Figure 8: C-TPAT logo 
(Source: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/car
go_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_o
verview.xml) 
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(U.S. CBP, 2004a, pp. 2,7 and Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 30). Only an 
entirely secured supply chain with trustworthy nodes and partners can grant maximum 
security, as it is not enough nowadays to only make borders or points of entries into the 
USA secure (U.S. CBP, 2007b and U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 10).  
C-TPAT is a voluntary program, offering a partnership between U.S customs 
authority (U.S. CBP) and any trading member. Its dual aim has the vision of securing 
the borders on the one hand, and facilitating trade on the other – a win-win situation for 
both U.S. CBP and C-TPAT members. There are five goals defined by U.S. CBP: 
Partners of C-TPAT should improve their supply chain security in order to meet C-
TPAT’s criteria; benefits and incentives should be provided to members; the main 
principles of C-TPAT are to be internationalized by cooperation; C-TPAT should 
support other initiatives by U.S. CBP; administration of the program is to be improved 
(U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 7). 
The main idea of the program is for companies to work predominately with 
suppliers which have a certain level of security standards and are members of similar 
programs in other countries, if available (Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 
36). Also, corporate relationships are being encouraged within the industry in order to 
strengthen and develop security in global supply chains as well as the exchange and 
implementation of best practices. By doing so, U.S. CBP should have more resources 
available to focus on the greatest threats in that context – imports into the United 
States. Currently the guidelines cover a huge number of topics in a broad range, such 
as “personnel, physical and procedural security; access controls; education, training 
and awareness; manifest procedures; conveyance security; threat awareness; and 
documentation processing” (U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 12).  
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In order to be eligible for C-TPAT, a company has to belong to one of the 
following business types: (U.S. CBP, 2005a)22 
• U.S. importers of record 
• U.S./Canada highway carriers 
• U.S./Mexico highway carriers 
• Rail carriers 
• Sea carriers 
• Air carriers 
• U.S. marine port authority/terminal operators 
                                                
22
 As of June 8, 2010. 
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• U.S. air freight consolidators, ocean transportation intermediaries and 
Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCC) 
• Mexican and Canadian manufacturers 
• Certain invited foreign manufacturers 
• Licensed U.S. customs brokers 
• Third-party logistics providers (3PL)23 
• Long-haul highway carriers in Mexico  
As the list above suggests, there is a strong focus on national and NAFTA 
companies, i.e. corporations based in the USA, Canada and Mexico. Table 12 shows 
the types of companies admitted to C-TPAT by origin of business. 
Type of Business/Country USA Canada Mexico Others 
Importers x    
Highway carriers x x x  
Rail carriers x x x x 
Sea carriers x x x x 
Air carriers x x x x 
Port authorities & terminal operators x    
Air freight consolidators, ocean 
transportation intermediates, NVOCC 
x    
Manufacturers  x x  
Manufacturers upon invitation    x 
Table 12: Types of companies by origin admitted to C-TPAT 
(Source: own creation after U.S. CBP, 2005a) 
When U.S. CBP launched the program, the only members were seven highly 
important U.S. American companies importing goods to the USA. In 2004 this number 
rose to 7,400 (U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 2). 
Most companies taking part in C-TPAT are U.S.-based businesses. However, 
due to the nature of C-TPAT, which aims to secure the global supply chain, there is a 
need to broaden the range of the program by either mutual recognition of similar 
programs with other countries or by opening up to foreign companies, too (U.S. CBP, 
2004a, p. 26). 
U.S. CBP grants admission to the program in a three-tier structure. The first is 
certification, followed by validation and the application of best practices (U.S. CBP, 
2006a, p. 3). As soon as a company has received the validation, it is revalidated every 
three years in order to grant the correct incorporation of standards (Thomas, 2008). 
                                                
23
 Applications being taken as of January 2009 (U.S. CBP, 2009a, p. 1). 
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Participation in the voluntary program may be costly for companies due to 
security standards that participating businesses are forced to introduce. In order to 
motivate companies to take part in this initiative, certain incentives and benefits have to 
be granted (U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 12). 
The higher the security a company can ensure, the more benefits will be granted 
by U.S. CBP. Therefore the program is divided into a three-tier structure for benefits as 
follows (U.S. CBP, 2006a, p. 3 and Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, pp. 34-35 
and U.S CBP, 2005b): 
Tier one – certification: Companies that are willing to take part in the program 
have to self-assess themselves first. This self-assessment is based on U.S. CBP’s 
guidelines. If the data submitted is reviewed and approved by the U.S. CBP, the 
company receives a certification, and is a member of the program henceforth. The 
main advantage certified organizations receive is a reduction in risk score, thus 
classifying as a lower-risk company. This again results in fewer physical examinations 
at the borders, a higher priority for mandatory examinations, less frequent inspections 
of main compliance, and even possible mitigation for penalties regarding U.S. customs 
legislation. It has to be noted that tier one certification is a prerequisite for Importer 
Self-Assessment (discussed below, in chapter 3.3.5.3) and another program that is 
only relevant for shipments between NAFTA members, called FAST. 
Tier two – validation24: In the next step, companies have to work out a 
validation process in order to comply with the content of the documents. All relevant 
supply chain processes are then validated by U.S. CBP supply chain security 
specialists (SCSS) on-site in order to ensure that the company is truly following 
standards and other measures of security. This tier stands for complying with minimum 
security standards. Validated companies receive twice the amount of risk score 
deducted, resulting in the benefits described in tier one to a higher extent. 
It appears that in practice most of the advantages companies can benefit from in 
tier two are already offered to tier one members, who are not validated.  
Tier three – best practices: After approval of certificate and validation by SCSS, 
the applicant can achieve the third, currently highest tier, which stands for exceeding 
the minimal standards. This is the case if a company can show up security standards 
and measures that excel the standards set by U.S. CBP and contribute to a more 
secure supply chain. Another possibility is to implement best practices that are to be 
                                                
24
 For a more detailed description of validation process please refer to U.S. CBP, 2005b.  
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found in a catalog issued and updated permanently by U.S. CBP25. Achieving tier 
three, by applying best practices, also means that: 
• Measures exceeding the minimal requirements are in place 
• Management support is incorporated 
• Security procedures and policies have to be in written form 
• A system of balances and checks has been implemented 
• Measures in order to monitor correct application are employed 
In addition, every member should take advantage of its C-TPAT membership by 
gaining access to security-related information systems, containing knowledge 
databases such as the best practice catalog. Also conferences, trainings, seminars and 
presentations are being held in order to keep members up to date. Furthermore, 
individually assigned SCSS can be contacted at any time to discuss security issues 
with the members. Within the framework of the annual C-TPAT symposium, members 
should also have the possibility to network in the industry. These events should also 
bridge to other security initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and 
Importer Self-Assessment (ISA), discussed further in chapter 3.3.5.1 and 3.3.5.3 (U.S. 
CBP, 2004a, p. 24 and U.S. CBP, 2008a, p. 3) 
Another benefit for C-TPAT members is the image drawn to the company by 
being part of the program. If customers know that a company is a member of C-TPAT, 
they surely know that high standards regarding security are being applied and that 
shipments will cross borders faster, thus being more predictable and less time-
consuming. Therefore, one can say that C-TPAT can also be used for marketing 
purposes (U.S. CBP, 2008a, p. 2). 
Also, if only a single container of an import consisting of more line items is to be 
examined by U.S. CBP, usually all containers have to be held at the port until the 
customs authority relieves the only container with the higher risk score. Therefore 
storage costs would apply to all containers at the port. However, in such a case, C-
TPAT members, under certain circumstances, are allowed to process all line items 
except for the one being examined, resulting in lower storage costs at the port (U.S. 
CBP, 2008a, p. 2). 
Without question, containers of C-TPAT members that have been chosen to be 
examined receive the highest priority at exam points, regardless of the waiting time of 
non-C-TPAT containers for the same exam (U.S. CBP, 2008a, p. 2). 
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 Latest version found on June 8, 2010 dates back to January 2006 (please refer to U.S. CBP, 2006a). 
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Figure 8 shows the benefits described above. Basic benefits refer to benefits 
granted to every C-TPAT member, while increasing benefits refer to benefits which 
increase by status. 
 
Figure 8: Benefits of C-TPAT membership 
(Source: own creation) 
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From 2003 to the very end of 2008 U.S. CBP has performed 10,367 validations in 
total (8,149 initial validations and 2,218 revalidations) (U.S. CBP, 2009a, p. 1). The 
most current26 internal statistics data for 2008 and is to be found in the table below. 
Accomplishments in 2008 
 
 
New members certified 1,448 
SC validated 3,469 
Members suspended 121 
Due to security incident (e.g. seizure) 49 
Due to inadequate security standards 72 
Members removed 118 
Due to security incident (e.g. seizure) 62 
Due to inadequate security standards 56 
                                                
26
 As of June 9, 2010. 
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Number of SCSS over 200 
additional SCSS (in 2008) 50 
Table 13: C-TPAT accomplishments in 2008 
(Source: U.S. CBP, 2009a, pp. 1-2) 
As Table 13 suggests, there is an increase of about 25% in supply chain security 
specialists. This number may be an indicator for U.S. CBP’s efforts to allocate more 
resources to the program. 
According to U.S. CBP, in the fiscal year of 2005 in total USD 33.9 million were 
raised for C-TPAT exclusively (U.S. CBP, 2004a, p. 35). 
A survey conducted for U.S CBP by the Center for Survey Research at the 
University of Virginia in August 2007 allows an insight into C-TPAT’s practical situation: 
The time before C-TPAT: Prior to joining C-TPAT, more than half (54.8%) of 
certified companies hardly knew anything about security initiatives. Almost half (46.6%) 
did not have any formal system in their company processes to assess and manage risk 
in their supply chains before applying to the program (Diop A., 2007c, p. 3). 
Motivation to join: Importers’ most important motivation for joining C-TPAT was 
to reduce disruptions in the SC. More than half of companies of other business types 
(62%) answered that their motivation was mainly the requirement of trading partners 
(Diop A., 2007c, p. 2). 
Costs of implementation: The most costly part of implementation was the set-
up for physical security such as doors, cameras, fences, electronic access, lighting, 
etc. On average, companies spent an amount of USD 38,471 on security items of this 
category. In addition, companies claimed that the highest costs of maintaining the 
programs were items such as “’maintaining the use of security personnel’ ($40,441) 
and ‘salaries and expenses of personnel’ ($28,454)” on average. Interestingly, 
approximately 60% of companies found implementation of C-TPAT easy or somewhat 
easy (Diop A., 2007c, p. 3). 
Benefits: For about one-third (32.6%) of companies interviewed, the benefits of 
C-TPAT outweighed the costs of the program. Another quarter (24.2%) thought that the 
costs and the benefits were almost the same. In general all businesses reported 
impacts of their C-TPAT membership in areas such as faster cargo release by CBP, 
security of workforce and the predictability of shipments. For more than a third (35.4%) 
of importers, inspections by U.S. CBP have decreased. Moreover, for more than half of 
these companies (51.7%), inspection decreased by more than half. Apparently the 
number of inspections decreased hand-in-hand with the duration of membership. Other 
benefits such as supply chain visibility, lead-time predictability, decreased number of 
disruptions, and increase in revenue and number of customers were reported, too. 
Most companies said that their ability to manage the global supply chain has been 
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strengthened (Diop A., 2007c, p. 3). The table below shows an overview of C-TPAT’s 
impact on all business types. 
Factor 
 
Increased No Change Decreased 
Time to release cargo by U.S. CBP 11.6% 50.4% 26.4% 
Time in U.S. CBP inspection lines 7.8% 43.7% 24.8% 
Predictability of moving goods 24.4% 51.2% 6.8% 
Opportunities for cost avoidance 16.8% 49.7% 6.2% 
Cargo theft and pilferage 4.7% 49.5% 15.6% 
Asset utilization 10.7% 53.0% 3.0% 
Security for workforce 34.8% 43.6% 1.4% 
Penalties 3.0% 47.8% 13.8% 
Insurance rates 2.8% 61.2% 5.4% 
Table 14: Impact of C-TPAT participation (all businesses) 
(Source: own creation after Diop A., 2007c, p. 46) 
The table above shows negative impacts in red and positive ones in green from 
businesses’ point of view. It is clear that in about 50% of the cases companies tended 
not to feel any positive or negative changes in their business operation. However, if 
there was a change, it was positive for more companies than negative. As for the 
release time it has to be noted that increasing time is not necessarily a problem of C-
TPAT, but an overall increase of U.S. CBP examination rates, which have increased 
from 8.7% to 21.6% in the space of four years, from 2002 to 2006 (Diop A., 2007c, p. 
47). In addition, companies reported intangible benefits, most notably “protects 
company’s brand image”, “makes company competitive” and “enhances marketing 
opportunities” (Diop A., 2007c, p. 53). 
Cost savings: In addition to the benefits mentioned above, businesses also 
reported cost savings from being C-TPAT members. The most important measures are 
“improving or implementing use of security personnel” (USD 24,496 on average) and 
“improving or implementing IT systems and database development” (USD 23,277 on 
average) (Diop A., 2007c, p. 50). 
According to the author, these cost savings might be a result of U.S CBP’s efforts 
of seminars and workshops as well as IT systems provided by C-TPAT as mentioned 
in chapter 3.3.3.2. 
Loyalty of C-TPAT members is relatively high: 78.1% of companies would 
definitely stay members. Only 0.6% of companies are considering cancelling their 
membership in the government-business program (U.S. CBP, 2008a, p. 3). 
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U.S. CBP has introduced an information processing and forwarding system, the 
Automated Manifest System, which is a “multi-modular cargo inventory control and 
release notification system for sea, air, and rail carriers” (U.S. CBP, 2009b). 
The main aim of the system is to interconnect as many parties in supply chains 
as possible, including U.S. CBP and other authorities, in order to make data 
concerning cargo more accessible and to forward crucial information regarding 
shipments through a unique system between the actors. In addition, U.S. CBP 
indicates that other benefits to trade partners are paperless bureaucracy, status 
notifications and notice of holds on cargo. The following parties may make use of the 
system (U.S. CBP, 2009b): 
• Carriers (air, sea, rail; truck carriers as secondary notify partners) 
• Port authorities 
• Service centers 
• Deconsolidators 
• Freight forwarders 
• Container freight stations 
• Terminal operators 
• Software vendors 
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The 24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule, also referred to as the 24-Hour 
Rule, came into force in May 2003. It requires sea cargo carriers to declare to U.S. 
CBP a given set of information 24 hours prior to lading in the port of departure, if the 
port of arrival is located in the USA. (U.S. CBP, 2004c) 
The data is to be transmitted via the Automated Manifest System (AMS) to 
authorities – only if not accessible can the party declare the information required on 
paper (U.S. CBP, 2004c). 
Data transmitted is then analyzed by the Automated Targeting System (ATS), 
which classifies shipments into dangerous and non-dangerous by means of hundreds 
of predefined criteria. Containers that are regarded to be dangerous are subject to a 
broader inspection by U.S. CBP. Information gathered by the customs authority is used 
to determine high-risk shipments prior to departure from the port of departure to the 
USA. High-risk shipments include for instance cargo that is smuggled or that might be 
used for terrorist attacks. In addition to monitoring activities, the data forwarded can 
also be used for faster processing (OECD, 2005, p. 119). 
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The following data is required by the 24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule 
(Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 39): 
1. Foreign port of departure 
2. Carrier’s Standard Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC) 
3. Voyage number 
4. Date of scheduled arrival 
5. Numbers and quantities from the carrier’s bills of lading 
6. The first port of receipt of the goods 
7. Precise description of the goods and/or Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTS) code 
8. Shipper’s complete name and address or identity number 
9. The consignee’s name and address or identification number 
10. Vessel name, national flag and vessel number 
11. Foreign port where the cargo was laden on board 
12. Hazardous material indicator, if cargo of this type is to be shipped 
13. Container number 
14. Seal number affixed to the container 
If the transmission of data 24 hours prior to departure is not undertaken, 
permission of import into the USA can be delayed or even denied. In addition, fines 
and other penalties can be imposed. 
The idea of this initiative is to emphasize prevention rather than inspection. It is 
assumed that implementation costs are lower than savings through prevention. The 
identification and filtering of suspicious containers is considered to be more efficient in 
time and costs than random physical inspections (Bichou, 2007). 
This initiative clearly includes the transmission and declaration of sensitive 
information. Also the information has to be sent earlier than implementation, which can 
be seen as a minor obstacle for businesses. 
It has to be mentioned that this initiative is the first of its kind, and therefore was 
subject to further improvements and updates (Veiter, 2009, p. 23). A newer initiative, 
the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirement, is discussed below. 
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The Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirement (ISF), which is 
also regarded as a 10+2 rule, represents an additional initiative that is meant to 
intensify the 24-Hour Rule mentioned in section 3.3.4.1 above. The main aim of this 
initiative is to improve the pre-identification of suspicious shipments. It came into force 
in January 2009. However, U.S. CBP allowed a grace time of 12 months where 
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companies trying to comply but having difficulties in doing so were not hit by penalties 
and fines (U.S. CBP, 2009c, p. 1 and U.S. DHS, 2008). 
In addition to the information required by the 24-Hour Rule, carriers have to 
include two more sets of information to U.S. CBP (U.S. DHS, 2008): 
1. Vessel Stow Plan: 48 hours after the carrier’s departure a set of data 
regarding the physical position of the container is to be submitted to U.S. 
CBP (U.S. DHS, 2008). The Vessel Stow Plan consists of the following data 
for each and every container individually: International Maritime 
Organization Number, operator of the vessel, size and type of equipment, 
stow position, Hazmat code27 (if applicable), port of origin and port of 
destination. This set of information is very useful for the U.S. CBP, as 
containers can be easily identified that have not been reported to the 
customs authority. Dangerous and high-risk cargo can be located easily, too 
(U.S. CBP, 2008b, pp. 2-3). 
2. Container Status Messages (CSM): Certain events have to be submitted 
to U.S. CBP on a daily basis if they occur, 24 hours after logged by the 
carrier. 
Also, the importer is required to send the following data 24 hours before lading 
the cargo onto the vessel (U.S. DHS, 2008): 
1. Seller 
2. Buyer 
3. Importer of record number/FTZ applicant identification number 
4. Consignee number(s) 
5. Manufacturer (or supplier) 
6. Ship to party 
7. Country of origin 
8. Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) number 
Additionally, two more datasets have to be submitted 24 hours prior to arrival in 
the U.S. port, namely container stuffing location and consolidator (U.S. DHS, 2008). 
Table 15 shows the approved communication systems for data transmission 
between companies and customs authorities. As one can see, Vessel Stow Plans have 
to be submitted via Automated Manifest System (AMS), Secure File Transfer Protocol 
(sFTP) or e-mail. For Container Status Messages the only applicable system is sFTP, 
whereas Importer Security Filing can be submitted via AMS or Automated Broker 
Interface (ABI) (U.S. CBP, 2008b, p. 3). 
                                                
27
 A code for hazardous materials. 
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Message Type 
 
Approved Communication System 
Vessel Stow Plans AMS, sFTP, e-mail  
CMS sFTP 
ISF AMS, ABI 
Table 15: Approved communication systems for ISF 
(Source: U.S. CBP, 2008b, p. 3) 
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In the United States exist a number of security programs in addition to the 
initiatives the author focuses on in this thesis (C-TPAT and AMS). Therefore, in order 
to give a full overview of security initiatives introduced by the USA, the author 
describes Container Security Initiative (CSI), Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), Importer 
Self-Assessment (ISA) and Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) in the sections below. It 
is essential to see the full picture of security programs in the USA, as the United States 
was most affected by the originating events of September 11, 2001 and therefore has 
created the most security-related programs in this area. 
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The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is, in 
contrast to C-TPAT, a maritime-only initiative that was 
introduced in 2002 by U.S. CBP. Its main aim is to 
facilitate container movement in sea traffic while ensuring 
security. This initiative solely focuses on container usage 
by terrorists or for terrorist attacks (U.S. CBP, 2006b, p. 
2). U.S. CBP claims that containers might be especially 
used for transport of terrorists and their equipment. As an 
example, U.S. CBP describes the actual event of 
October 18, 2001 when a fully equipped container was found that housed a terrorist 
with technical equipment such as mobile phone, computer, satellite phone and even 
valid airport security identification cards (U.S. CBP, 2006b, p. 11). 
Therefore, the main idea of the Container Security Initiative is to shift prevention, 
control and inspection to the outside of US borders. By employing control measures at 
the port of departure, high-risk containers should be identified before entering the 
United States of America. CSI officers together with authority officers from the 
bilaterally contracted countries inspect containers that are being moved through the 
port of question to the USA (U.S. CBP, 2006b, p. 6). 
Figure 9: Container 
Security Initiative logo 
(Source: U.S. CBP, 2008c) 
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CSI improves security and facilitation by focusing on three main goals (U.S. CBP, 
2006b, pp. 4-5): 
1. Identification of high-risk containers: Evaluation of all containers 
destined for the USA in order to identify containers of high risk, especially 
tools for terrorist attacks or terrorist weapons. This prevents containers of 
high risk to be laden onto ships with destination to the USA, 
2. Resistant security program: Build up a container security program that 
resists terrorist attacks, and even in the event of an actual threat or attack 
can facilitate cargo movement through CSI ports, or at least resume the 
flow of goods more quickly, 
3. Incentives and benefits: Legitimate trade should not be hindered but 
facilitated. Also benefits and incentives should be granted to 
governments, organizations and partners of U.S. CBP. 
The following goals are to be achieved by the core elements of CSI (U.S. CBP, 
2007a and U.S. CBP, 2008c): 
1. Identification of high-risk containers 
2. Evaluation and screening of identified containers before leaving the port 
of departure 
3. Screening and facilitation at the same time 
4. Use of state of the art, modern, smart and more secure containers. 
The goals and core elements are summarized graphically in Figure 10 below. 
 
Figure 10: Goals and Elements of CSI 
(Source: own creation) 
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For the Container Security Initiative U.S. CBP has selected ports that process the 
most containers towards the United States of America and ports that are most probably 
affected by terrorist connections. As a result, it can be ensured that approximately 86% 
of all containers arriving in the USA by sea are subject to inspection at the port of 
departure, as 58 operational ports are taking part in CSI (U.S. CBP, 2008c). The most 
recent28 list of CSI operational ports can be found in Appendix C. 
In the first step, the Container Security Initiative uses the information provided by 
the 24-Hour Rule, as the data of all containers heading to the USA is submitted into the 
system 24 hours prior to lading. In addition, U.S. CBP is able to obtain even more 
information due to collaboration with foreign authorities. These data are then 
processed by U.S. CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS), which automatically 
assigns a risk level to each container by using a set of hundreds of rules that is 
updated and revised continuously. The reason for using the ATS is obvious: the cost of 
screening only containers selected by the ATS is much lower than to individually 
screen all containers 
with destination to the 
USA (U.S. CBP, 2006b, 
pp. 15-16).  
U.S. CBP officers 
then inspect containers 
that are rated as high-
risk containers by the 
ATS. This can be done 
by either employing 
non-intrusive inspection (NII) or physical inspection (U.S. CBP, 2008c). NII includes 
gamma, X-ray and radiation scanners that give a general overview of the containers’ 
contents. Usually physical inspection is employed only in the case of anomalies. In 
order to not affect the speed of cargo movement, inspections are usually carried out 
when the container is waiting to be laden onto the ship. In this way, the inspection does 
not add extra waiting time for cargo. For the future, U.S. CBP expects further 
improvements due to newer, up-to-date technology and information systems. These 
include broader application of the Global Pointing System (GPS) in order to fully 
understand a container's movements and the Automated Commercial Environment 
(ACE), an information system developed by the U.S. CBP to interconnect as many 
parties as possible. In addition, electronic surveillance, electronic seals and 
improvements in container security in general are considered as drivers for security 
                                                
28
 The only list on U.S. CBP's official website that promotes "Current Operational Ports" dates back to 
December 28, 2007 as of July 21, 2010. 
Figure 11: Non-intrusive inspection system image (X-
ray) 
(Source: U.S. CBP, 2007f, p. 2) 
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across the supply chain and supportive measures for the Container Security Initiative 
(U.S. CBP, 2006b, pp. 17-18). 
In return for the efforts of CSI ports, U.S. CBP offers benefits to participating 
communities and the industry. These include the usage of natural container downtime 
for inspection, which provides a higher level of security and faster movement of cargo 
with less intrusive inspections (U.S. CBP, 2006b, pp. 19, 29). The only real advantage 
of CSI is that in the event of a terrorist attack CSI ports are more likely to proceed with 
operation and thus have competitive advantage in this particular situation (U.S. CBP, 
2007c, p. 4). In addition, the hosting country of the CSI port may send their officers to 
ports in the USA and likewise examine the security of containers being shipped to the 
host country. Japan and Canada have already seized the opportunity (U.S. CBP, 
2008c). All in all, only a small number of countries have taken up this opportunity 
(OECD, 2005, p. 119).  
Table 16 shows the annual funding and increase of CSI between 2004 and 2007. 
Fiscal year 2004 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Funding  USD 61 mn USD 126 mn USD 139 mn USD 141mn 
! in regard to 
previous year 
n/a +106% +10% +1% 
Table 16: CSI funding 
(Source: own creation after U.S. CBP, 2006b, p. 32) 
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The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) focuses on the 
detection of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
sea containers. SFI is an initiative that adds value to both 
Container Security Initiative and Megaports. Megaports is a 
program that prevents nuclear material from being laden 
onto a ship by high-technology scanning devices.  SFI 
combines both CSI and Megaports by using Megaports' 
machinery, know-how and processes and the Automated 
Targeting System (ATS) by CSI. Doing so, SFI contributes to 
both initiatives' missions (U.S. CBP, 2007e, pp. 1-2 and 
NNSA, 2010). SFI does not intend to replace those initiatives 
Figure 12: Secure 
Freight Initiative 
logo 
(Source: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgo
v/trade/cargo_security/sec
ure_freight_initiative/sfi_ne
ws_lp.xml 
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but rather support them and add another level of security to maritime container 
shipments. For U.S. CBP (2007e, p. 2), SFI "represents the evolution of both programs 
by providing the integration of data that makes the combined effort greater than the 
sum of each part." 
When SFI was first introduced it used data by ATS only, to identify possible high-
risk containers. However, by now SFI even contributes data collected on its own effort 
to CSI to maximize the ATS database and in that way allow a full collaboration. SFI 
enables a higher density of screenings without hindering trade. SFI does not only scan 
containers that are rated high-risk by the ATS but also additional cargo (U.S. CBP, 
2007e, p. 2). 
SFI intends to scan all US-inbound containers at the port of departure using NII 
methods such as radiation scanning devices and optical surveillance instruments for 
identification. These images are then forwarded in real-time to the National Targeting 
Center (NTS) for risk scoring. NTS uses additional information such as the mandatorily 
required manifest data in combination with the images for identification of threats. If a 
container is rated as a high-risk container containing radioactive or similar materials, 
physical inspection is required (U.S. DHS, 2006). 
Efforts of SFI are high: U.S. CBP now forces a 100% screening of all cargo 
destined to the United States of America from any of the 700 ports currently shipping to 
the USA (U.S. CBP, 2007e, p. 1).  
U.S. CBP claims that costs of 51 existing CSI ports to comply with SFI will equal  
USD 870 mn for U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) only, not including 
costs for Department of Energy (DOE) maintaining Megaports (U.S. CBP, 2007e, p. 2). 
In 2008 U.S. CBP claimed to have successfully implemented 100% screening of all 
US-inbound containers at the ports of Qasim (Pakistan), Puerto Cortes (Honduras) and 
Southampton (UK). Additionally, the ports of Hong Kong, Salalah (Oman) and Busan 
(South Korea) implemented SFI on a limited basis (U.S. CBP, 2008d). 
Benefits of the program are general advanced security and better and more 
fluent access to U.S. markets in the case of a terrorist event (U.S. CBP, 2007e, p. 2). 
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The Importer Self-Assesment (ISA) was developed by the U.S CBP as a 
voluntary customs-to-private partnership for resident importers. The main aim of ISA is 
to persuade companies to comply with the requirements of U.S. CBP and thus 
maintain the level trade compliance through internal controlling mechanisms (U.S. 
CBP, 2002, p. 3). Partnership between U.S. CBP and the company strongly relies on 
the commitment and compliance of the business – one can say that due to the 
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periodic, reported self-assessment, ISA is rather an internally controlled program by 
companies rather than compliance monitored by U.S. CBP (U.S. CBP, 2005c, p. 4). 
According to the author, this is a further step of U.S. CBP to outsource monitoring and 
the implementation of security measures similarly to C-TPAT. In return for the 
companies' effort, they receive benefits from U.S. CBP (U.S. CBP, 2002, p. 3). The ISA 
can be regarded as a facilitation program rather than a security program – however the 
program goes hand in hand with C-TPAT, as shown by the corresponding prerequisites 
below (Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 41). 
In order to apply for ISA a company has to (U.S. CBP, 2005c, p. 2 and U.S. CBP, 
2002, p. 3): 
• Be a C-TPAT member 
• Be a resident importer in the USA 
• Have at least two years of experience with importing 
• Submit an ISA questionnaire (mainly focused on monitoring, control 
measures, documentation and general compliance (U.S. CBP, 2005c, pp. 
5-6)) 
• Submit an ISA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
• Agree to meet U.S. CBP requirements and comply with law 
• Set up and maintain internal control measures 
• Have access to the Internet 
• Periodically send reports required by the ISA program to U.S. CBP 
The procedure of admission can take up to four months (Swedish National Board 
of Trade, 2008, p. 41). As soon as the company is admitted to and complies with the 
program it receives further benefits from U.S. CBP. These include consultation 
services offered by U.S. CBP, no Focused Assessments by the Regulatory Audit 
Division (RAD) or other assessments, availability of entry summary trade data and 
analysis, and certain mitigations in the event of incorrect declaration and civil penalties. 
U.S. CBP will introduce certain industry-specific benefits in the future. In addition, the 
greatly developed internal control systems should give the company a high level of 
business certainty (U.S. CBP, 2005c, pp. 3, 5). 
When a company is involved in the ISA program it has certain obligations to carry 
out. These include annual reports as mentioned previously, compliance with law and 
regulations, maintenance and improvement of the internal control system, periodic 
tests and reporting of the control system and the use of an alternate system to report 
correct values to U.S. CBP (U.S. CBP, 2005c, pp. 4-5). 
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Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is a research and testing initiative by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, so it cannot be compared to any other programs 
described in this thesis. However, OSC is essential in order to develop equipment and 
processes to keep the international supply chain secure. Analyses, tests and solutions 
are provided in matters of supply chain security. The main objective of this program is 
to enhance security in the maritime sector, secure the supply chain and facilitate trade. 
Research and testing is partially done by the private sector (U.S. DHS, 2004). The 
areas and results of OSC include amongst others the development and testing of 
equipment such as intrusion detection (such as e-seal), detection sensors (of radiation, 
chemicals and hazardous biological materials) and scanners for non-intrusive 
inspection (NII) (such as X-ray, gamma-ray and infrared scanners) (U.S. DOT, 2010). 
According to the Swedish National Board of Trade (2008, p. 41), Operation Safe 
Commerce is a "system financed by Congress for companies' research programmes" 
to enhance security in the international SC. 
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In order to make collaborative strategies easier to understand, the author will 
compare the initiatives described in sections 3.1 to 3.3. The colors in the tables 
indicate the origin of the programs and initiatives. Blue stands for the EU, red for the 
USA and green for international organizations. 
First, the initiatives of international organizations (green) and by the EU (blue) 
and the USA (red) are presented in chronological order. 
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Table 17: Timeline of security initiatives by the EU, the USA and international 
organizations 
(Source: own creation) 
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As Table 17 suggests, the first initiative in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001 was introduced by the USA, the target of those attacks, shortly 
afterwards. In general one can say that the USA naturally had a faster agility and was 
the first to introduce measures against such events and implement programs in order 
to facilitate trade as a result of more severe customs directives. Only three years later, 
the IMO came up with a fully worked out program, the ISPS Code, shortly after which 
the WCO introduced the SAFE Framework, which was then implemented by the 
European Union. Further developments were then made by the EU and the USA. 
The table below shows the range of security initiatives for containers being 
shipped from the European Union to the United States of America. 
   SFI     
   MP29     
ECS   CSI    ISA 
   ISPS     
   ISF     
   24H30     
   C-TPAT     
   AEO     
EU 
exp31 
LP 
HL32 
carrier 
EU port 
Sea 
carrier 
US port 
HL 
carrier 
US 
imp33 
Table 18: Range of security initiatives 
(Source: own creation) 
As suggested by Table 18, both the European Union and the United States have 
measures that reach the whole international supply chain, namely AEO on the EU's 
side and C-TPAT on the USA's. Most security initiatives that are settled in ports are 
U.S. American initiatives (CSI, SFI, Megaports). One has to consider that the ports with 
U.S. initiatives are not based in the United States. Thus cargo security measures for 
screening and threat targeting which are introduced by the USA are "outsourced" to 
offshore ports. Data flows in this comparison are mostly initiated by the US, as in the 
EU exporter/US importer relation the import data requirements of the EU cannot be 
illustrated. 
Table 19 below shows whether the programs and initiatives described in this 
thesis are voluntary or mandatory. The main aim is also described. 
                                                
29
 Megaports 
30
 24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule 
31
 Exporter 
32
 Hinterland 
33
 Importer 
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Name of Initiative 
 
Mandatory/Voluntary 
 
Aim 
ISPS Mandatory Legal framework 
SAFE Framework Mandatory for governments Legal framework 
AEO Voluntary Cooperation 
ECS Mandatory Data 
ICS Mandatory Data 
24-Hour Rule Mandatory Data 
C-TPAT Voluntary Cooperation 
CSI Mandatory (agreements) Screening 
ISA Voluntary Cooperation 
ISF Mandatory Data 
Megaports Mandatory (agreements) Screening 
MTSA Mandatory Legal framework 
OSC Voluntary Research program 
SAFE Port Act Mandatory Legal framework 
SFI Mandatory (agreements) Screening 
Table 19: Mandatory and voluntary security initiatives and programs and their 
primary aim 
(Source: own creation) 
As Table 19 suggests, legal frameworks (ISPS, SAFE Framework, MTSA, SAFE 
Port Act) are due to their nature generally mandatory. Data-related requirements are 
also compulsory (ECS, ICS, 24-Hour Rule, ISF). Cargo screening programs such as 
CSI, Megaports and SFI depend on agreements between the U.S. and implementing 
nations. Programs that rely on cooperation between customs authorities and 
businesses are voluntary (AEO, C-TPAT, ISA). Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) as a 
part of U.S. CBP's cargo security program is voluntary and has a slightly different 
orientation, namely research. 
G>H>= 6,2Q('8+1!#ME!&,!6^4?#4!
In order to more easily understand the collaboration between the EU and USA in 
the topic of focus (C-TPAT and AEO as well as advance notification), the author will 
below contrast several characteristics of these programs and requirements. 
 AEO 
 
C-TPAT 
Origin EU USA 
Type Customs-to-business Customs-to-business 
Main aim Enhance security throughout Enhance security throughout the 
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the whole supply chain 
through identifying low-risk 
economic operators 
whole supply chain through 
identifying low-risk companies. 
Basis EC Regulations, under 
consideration of SAFE 
Framework by WCO 
SAFE Port Act, with MTSA 2002 as 
basis 
Levels Level 1: AEO-C 
Level 2: AEO-S 
Level 3: AEO-F 
Level 1: Certification 
Level 2: Validation 
Level 3: Best Practices 
Admission to 
1st level 
Compliance with regulations 
Accounting system 
Verifiable liquidity 
Self-Assessment 
Approval of Self-Assessment 
Admission to 
2nd level 
Level 1 plus: 
Security standards 
Internal validation process 
Validation by U.S. CBP 
Admission to 
3rd level 
Level 1 plus: 
Security standards 
Implementation of best practices 
Creation of best practices 
Higher internal security standards 
than required 
Hard benefits Depending on certification34: 
Fewer controls (phys/doc) 
Upon control prioritization 
Choice of place of control 
Easier admittance to customs 
simplifications 
Reduced datasets 
Depending on certification35: 
Reduction of risk score 
Fewer physical inspections 
Higher priority for examinations 
Fewer inspections of compliance 
Possible mitigation for penalties 
 
Soft benefits Improved relations to customs 
Company image/marketing 
Mutual recognition 
Access to information (E-
learning) 
Improved relations to customs 
Company image/marketing 
Networking 
Access to information 
Type of 
business 
admitted 
Organizations that are 
"involved in activities covered 
by customs legislation"36 
Mostly restricted to U.S., Canadian 
and Mexican companies involved in 
international supply chains. Type of 
business also restricted37. 
Table 20: General comparison of AEO and C-TPAT 
(Source: own creation) 
                                                
34
 For further details please refer to Table 9 on page 33. 
35
 For further details please refer to section 3.3.3.2 on page 43. 
36
 European Commission, 2006a, p. 66. 
37
 For further details please consult section 3.3.3.1 on page 41. 
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Aim: As one can see, the two customs-to-business cargo security programs AEO 
and C-TPAT have many similarities. They both aim to identify low-risk companies and 
grant certain benefits upon fulfillment of given requirements. 
Three level approach: Both programs have a three-level approach, even though 
there is a slight difference. 
AEO offers the choice between AEO-C (Customs) and AEO-S (Security) or the 
package of both, called AEO-F (Full). These certificates refer to mitigation in different 
areas, and thus have different requirements. With AEO-F the economic operator has a 
certificate that is adequate to the sum of AEO-C and AEO-S in both benefits and 
requirements. 
C-TPAT on the other hand offers a three-tier system – the more requirements are 
fulfilled by the company, the more benefits it receives in return.  
Benefits: When it comes to benefits between the two programs, one can see 
that certain benefits are granted by both programs or at least are very similar, while 
others show differences. The main analogies are that both programs show "trust" to its 
members, and therefore grant benefits. Both AEO and C-TPAT members' cargo is 
subject to fewer inspections, and upon mandatory examinations they receive full 
priority. Not only inspections but other mitigations – albeit different ones – are offered 
to members of both programs when it comes to activities with customs’ authority rather 
than cargo security per se. AEO on the one hand allows its members reduced datasets 
for advance notification and other customs simplifications. C-TPAT on the other hand 
even offers mitigation of penalties and fewer inspections of general compliance. 
The "soft benefits" appear to be the same: Both programs canvass their benefits 
with the access to certain information, possibilities to promote the company's secure 
image through marketing activities and emphasize that membership means a better 
relation and cooperation between the customs authority and the business itself. 
Type of business: When it comes to the type of business admitted for 
membership there is a relevant difference between the programs. AEO has a very 
general ruling of possible applicants, covering all companies that have anything to do 
with customs. C-TPAT on the other hand restricts the list of applicants to those from 
certain industries, with a strong emphasis on U.S.-based companies and certain 
Canadian and Mexican businesses. Only sea and air carriers of other countries can 
apply for a C-TPAT membership. Foreign manufacturers have to receive an invitation 
explicitly.  
Another possibility to compare AEO and C-TPAT is by security measures 
applied. 
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Security Measure 
 
AEO C-TPAT WCO 
Facility management    
Warehouse/terminal design x x x 
Inventory management and control x   
Facility monitoring x x x 
Facility surveillance  x x 
Access and presence control x x x 
Cargo management    
Prevention, detection and reporting of shipping 
process anomalies 
  x 
Inspections during the shipping process x x x 
Use of cargo inspection technical solutions   x 
Use of cargo tracking technical solutions    
Use of anti-tampering technical solutions x x x 
Personnel    
Employee hiring/exit process x x x 
Personnel training x x x 
Information dissemination   x 
Organizational roles and responsibilities    
Security culture development  x x 
Information management system    
Quality assurance of data and information systems  x  
Protection of business information x x x 
Recordkeeping of shipping information for potential 
security audits 
x x  
Exchange of information with customs authorities x x x 
Use of international standards for data management   x 
Business network & company management 
system 
   
Company security management system x x x 
Logistics system designed to reduce risks    
Logistics system designed for rapid recovery   x 
Business partners evaluation system  x x 
Establishment of partnership with customs 
administration in security matters 
x x x 
Table 21: Comparison of AEO, C-TPAT and SAFE Framework by security 
measures 
(Source: Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 93) 
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Table 21 suggests that there are certain areas where AEO and C-TPAT are 
similar, but there are differences between the programs. WCO is not being compared 
to the programs by the author. 
AEO and C-TPAT both have rules for warehouse and terminal design, factory 
monitoring, access and presence control, inspections during the shipping process, anti-
tampering techniques, human resources management, protection of business 
information, recordkeeping of shipping information, exchange of information with 
customs, company security management system and the establishment of partnerships 
with customs administration. 
However, AEO has rules for inventory management and control, whereas C-
TPAT does not. 
C-TPAT seems however to have more requirements than AEO does: Facility 
surveillance, security culture development, quality assurance of data and IT systems 
and business partners evaluation system are security measures required by C-TPAT 
but not AEO. 
All in all, comparing two programs of high complexity such as the European and 
U.S. customs-private partnership is very difficult. Also it has to be mentioned that some 
areas might not be included in these programs but might be part of other programs that 
might add to the security level of a nation. As an example, C-TPAT does not include 
"cargo inspection technical solution", however another U.S. program, namely CSI, does 
make use of cargo inspection (Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 94). 
Summing up, the two initiatives AEO and C-TPAT are very similar in many ways. 
However AEO seems to have less detail in certain requirements. Benchmarks in C-
TPAT already exist: C-TPAT members are advised to contract AEO members as 
partner companies. On the other hand invited companies from outside the U.S. must 
have AEO certification (Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 94). 
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In this section the author will compare advance notification requirements by the 
EU and the USA that apply for maritime cargo shipping. 
In order to have the possibility to compare it is essential to understand that for the 
European summary notification only the inbound component is taken into account, so 
that there is a basis for comparison. As we have seen earlier, the U.S. data 
requirements fail to have an outbound component (Swedish National Board of Trade, 
2008, p. 95). The author does not compare the WCO with the EU or the USA in this 
section. 
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Data 
 
EU 24H38 ISF WCO 
TRANSPORTATION     
Equipment ID x x  x 
Reference number of transport  x  x 
Unique consignment reference number x   x 
Transport document number x    
Declaration date x    
Signature/authentication x    
Countries of transit x   x 
Place of loading  x  x 
Code for payment of transport charges x   x 
Place where the container is loaded   x  
Customs office exists x x  x 
ID and nationality of active means of transport 
at border crossings 
 x  x 
First place of arrival  x  x 
Scheduled date and time of arrival  x  x 
Destination of goods   x x 
Place of unloading x    
Location of goods x    
Description of freight  x  x 
Shipping marks x    
Seal number x x  x 
Vessel Stow Plan   x  
Container Status Message   x  
PARTIES     
Manufacturer   x  
Vendor   x  
Exporter    x 
Carrier  x  x 
Importer   x x 
Recipient x x x x 
Buyer   x  
Consignor x  x x 
Consolidator   x  
Agent or Representative    x 
Person lodging the summary declaration x    
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Parties to be informed x   x 
CARGO INFORMATION     
Country of origin   x  
Description of goods x x x x 
Code for dangerous goods x x  x 
Number of items x    
Goods item number x    
Total gross weight x x  x 
Total invoiced amount    x 
Type of package and number of packages x x  x 
Code for other special circumstances (AEO) x    
Table 22: Comparison of data required for advance notification in the EU, the 
USA and according to the WCO 
(Source: own creation after Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, pp. 96, 98) 
Table 22 shows in blue the data that is required in matters of advance notification 
by both the EU and the USA. Data that is required in the EU but not in the USA is 
written in green, while data required by the USA but not the EU is written in red. 
The variation is due to a different approach of the EU and the US. While the 
United States regards certain additional information to be essential for security 
purposes, the EU has also decided to require so-called workflow information (number 
of items, goods item number, shipping marks, place of unloading, person lodging the 
summary declaration, date of declaration, authorization, location of goods). The code 
for other special circumstances stands for the AEO number if applicable (Swedish 
National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 95).  
Security-wise, the USA requires more information about the cargo than the EU 
does. If we take a closer look at Table 22 we can see that in contrast to the USA, the 
EU does not require data regarding the carrier, voyage, vessel, manufacturer, country 
of origin, location of container loading, vendor, consolidator and buyer. Also the ISF 
requires two additional data after loading the container into the vessel: the Vessel Stow 
Plan and Container Status Messages.  
When comparing the advance notification requirements of both the EU and the 
USA it is evident that often the terms for the data required do not match, even though 
the same data is meant. 
All in all, one can say that the EU and the USA go their own ways when it comes 
to advance notification. Some of the data required is mutual, however the concept and 
the required data differ (Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, p. 97). 
The table below shows when the report has to be prepared in the EU and the 
USA. 
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Time of Report 
 
Set of Data (EU) Set of Data (USA) 
24 hours prior 
lading at port of 
departure 
Advance Notification (ENS) 24-Hour Rule 
Importer Security Filing 
48 hours after 
departure 
 Vessel Stow Plan (ISF) 
24 hours after 
occurrence 
 Container Status Message 
(ISF) 
Table 23: Comparison of advance notification's time of report in the EU and the 
USA 
(Source: own creation) 
As Table 23 suggests, the main part of advance notification datasets is to be 
reported 24 hours prior to lading at the port of departure in both the EU and the USA. 
Importer Security Filing in addition requires two more data items to be submitted: 
Vessel Stow Plan (with the exact location of the containers on the vessel) 48 hours 
after departure and Container Status Messages 24 hours after occurrence. 
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Cargo security programs have the aim to secure nations against terrorism and 
other unauthorized access that have an influence on security. Further they have the 
objective to facilitate trade. In theory both the EU and USA report to succeed in this 
dual objective. So if security programs with the same objective are present in both the 
EU and the USA and have a lot of in common, wouldn't it be the best to jointly roll out 
these programs or at least mutually recognize memberships in order to ease trade 
across borders? Mutual recognition is not only a matter of joint efforts but also politics 
and jurisdiction. This section will deal with the existent efforts of the EU and the USA to 
mutually recognize security programs.  
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Mutual recognition between customs-to-business partnership programs of the EU 
and USA would result in a number of benefits for both customs administrations signing 
the mutual recognition agreement and businesses, which are members of either AEO 
or C-TPAT. 
U.S. CBP mentions a list of five benefits that might arise from mutual recognition 
(U.S. CBP, 2010, pp. 4-5): 
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• Efficiency 
• Risk assessment tool 
• Less redundancy/duplication of efforts 
• Common standards/trade facilitation 
• Transparency 
Efficiency: The customs authority does not have to inspect and validate 
companies in foreign countries, thus expenses are saved. 
Risk assessment tool: "The status of the foreign partnership program 
participant is recognized by C-TPAT and it is used as a risk-assessment factor. A C-
TPAT validation visit will be conducted on a different segment of the C-TPAT importer's 
supply chain" (U.S. CBP, 2010, p. 5). 
Less redundancy and duplication of efforts: Only one validation process is 
needed for companies, as the validation of one program is automatically recognized by 
the other program. This applies also for revalidations: these are conducted only once 
and recognized by the other program, too. Therefore companies do not have to spend 
extra resources on double validations and revalidations. 
Common standards and trade facilitation: Having mutual recognition between 
two programs means that applicants only have to comply with one set of security 
standards or requirements. Thus companies do not have to put the effort in complying 
and implementing two sets of standards that, in some areas, might be dual. 
Additionally, U.S. CBP declares that if one company complies with C-TPAT 
requirements it automatically complies with security-related requirements set by 
countries of mutual recognition. 
Transparency: International commerce could become more transparent due to 
the close collaboration of customs authorities. Trade is being facilitated through a more 
efficient information exchange. 
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U.S. CBP promotes internationalization of C-TPAT. According to U.S. CBP 
(2004a, p. 7), one of the main goals is to "internationalize the core principles of C-
TPAT through cooperation and coordination with the international community." This 
effort includes not only cooperation with other customs authorities but also support for 
global supply chain security frameworks sponsored by WCO. In addition, C-TPAT best 
practices are openly available, organizations can identify security standards and 
practical application of security measures more easily. C-TPAT is also to be promoted 
through its members, who are contractually requiring C-TPAT standards from their 
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manufacturers or suppliers in foreign countries, even though the latter are not actual 
members of the customs-to-business program (U.S. CBP, 2004a, pp. 26-28).  
As this thesis focuses on the customs-to-customs aspect of internationalization 
between the EU and the USA, it is essential to understand how the customs authorities 
view "mutual recognition" (MR). U.S. CBP defines mutual recognition as the exchange 
of information between two customs authorities in order to "recognize the validation 
findings" between the authorities and thus allow businesses and customs authorities to 
benefit through bilateral agreements between customs administrations (U.S. CBP, 
2010a, p. 1). It is of high importance that the concept of mutual recognition is part of 
the SAFE Framework by WCO39, which again is supported by the USA. 
Country 
 
Name of Program Mutual Recognition 
New Zealand Secure Export Scheme (SES) June 2007 
Canada Partners in Protection Program (PIP) June 2008 
Jordan Golden List Program (GLP) June 2008 
Japan Authorizes Economic Operator (AEO) June 2009 
Korea Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) In Progress 
Singapore Secure Trade Partnership Plus (STP-Plus) In Progress 
EU Authorizes Economic Operator (AEO) In Progress 
Table 24: C-TPAT mutual recognition arrangements 
(Source: own creation after U.S. CBP, 2010, p. 2) 
U.S. CBP claims to be the number one customs authority in matters of signed 
mutual recognition arrangements (MRA) (U.S. CBP, 2010, p. 2). 
As one can see from Table 24, the EU and the USA are currently attempting to 
mutually recognize each other's programs. 
In order to mutually recognize a program by the U.S. CBP, three prerequisites 
must be met (U.S. CBP, 2010, pp. 2-3): 
• Fully operational program that is not in development 
• Strong validation process 
• Strong security component 
Mutual recognition requires from U.S. CBP's point of view four steps (U.S. CBP, 
2010, p. 3): 
1. Comparison in theory – whether the programs are compatible 
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 Mutual recognition is a component of the WCO SAFE Framework's customs-to-customs pillar as 
described in section 3.1.1.1 on page 19. 
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2. Comparison in practice – joint validation visits pilot program 
3. Signing of MRA (preferably at WCO headquarters) 
4. Development of operational processes – information sharing environment 
G>K>G @&(&<%!D<,!,5!I<&<(.!B/),1+8&8,+!$/&-//+!&C/!MU!(+0!&C/!U@#!
The EU's and USA's efforts in customs cooperation have a long-reaching history. 
In 1997 an agreement on mutual customs assistance and customs cooperation was 
signed. In 2004 a more intense cooperation was started – CSI being one of the core 
components of the agreement signed. In addition, two groups were created, namely 
the Security Standards Group and the Trade Partnership Group. It has been an aim of 
those groups to bring AEO and C-TPAT together, although the actual agreement of the 
two programs' mutual recognition wasn’t signed until November 2007. The objective 
was to mutually recognize AEO and C-TPAT by 2009 (Swedish National Board of 
Trade, 2008, pp. 59-60). In 2008 a roadmap was created for the mutual recognition of 
the programs. In 2009 the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee published an 
abridged roadmap40 with the aim of making the efforts more transparent to the public 
(EC, 2010a). In order to progress with mutual recognition between the EU and the 
USA, workshops were held in the EU in fall 2009. They provided more lucidity of how 
AEO works. The next step, namely joint validation visits in the EU, have still not taken 
place. Probably this is the most important stage for U.S. CBP to understand how the 
European Union's program works. Another very important point is to understand the 
EU's principles of uniform application of the AEO amongst its member states (U.S. 
CBP, 2010, p. 3). 
Date 
 
Event 
1997 Agreement on mutual customs assistance and cooperation  
2004 Agreement on intensified cooperation in matters of container 
security, creation of two working groups 
2006 Merger of the two working groups 
2007 Results of the CSI pilot program at EU feeder ports and C-
TPAT and Joint Risk Rules 
2008 Adaptation of roadmap for mutual recognition  
2009 Creation and publication of abridged roadmap to the public 
 Workshops 
Table 25: History of AEO's and C-TPAT's mutual recognition 
(Source: own creation after Swedish National Board of Trade, 2008, pp. 59-60 and EC, 2010a) 
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 Please refer to section 3.5.4 on page 70 and European Commission (2009e) for further information. 
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By March 2010 the EU and the USA had made strides towards the joint aim of 
mutual recognition. Of the four steps mentioned in section 3.5.2 on page 67 the first 
one is accomplished. According to both the EU and the USA, AEO and C-TPAT are in 
theory fully compatible with analogical requirements for security-related standards and 
criteria (U.S. CBP, 2010, p. 3). 
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According to the "Abridged External Partner Version of the U.S.-EU Joint 
Customs Cooperation Committee Roadmap Towards Mutual Recognition of Trade 
Partnership Programs" (Abridged Roadmap Towards MR), several steps need to be 
taken in order to finally mutually recognize AEO and C-TPAT. The document 
distinguishes between operational/technical, legal and evaluation steps. The Abridged 
Roadmap Towards MR is to be found in Appendix D on page 114. 
Mostly the steps mentioned in The Abridged Roadmap Towards Mutual 
Recognition are to be carried out under joint effort. However some steps are program-
specific, and need the U.S. CBP's attention only. The status of these steps may be 
"ongoing", "in progress" or "pending". 
The sections above should give a brief summary of The Abridged Roadmap 
Towards MR. 
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Information in this section originates from the Abridged Roadmap Towards MR 
(EC, 2009d, pp. 3-4). 
Information technology: Under joint effort the EU and the USA have to discuss 
which data elements will be exchanged for purposes of mutual recognition and 
additionally agree on guidelines of data transmission41. Also an IT system has to be 
established for automated data exchange between the EU and the USA. 
Updates and training: Both the EU and the USA have to communicate changes 
in a legal environment that might have an effect on the mutual recognition of the 
programs. In addition, conferences and training modules have to be exchanged and 
joint participation is anticipated. Also audits and validation visits of AEO and C-TPAT 
members are to be carried out together in order to understand one another's methods. 
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 Primarily general data regarding AEO/C-TPAT members and status updates. 
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Best Practice Seminars are being held, so that experts from the EU and the USA can 
exchange. Government representatives from both sides have to be informed about 
mutual recognition and its benefits. 
Communication and cooperation with businesses: Businesses shall be 
informed about the progress of mutual recognition, especially regarding the benefits. 
Also feedback from the private sector has to be gathered in order to incorporate them 
in the roadmap. 
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Information in this section originates from (EC, 2009d, pp. 4-5). 
Export component of C-TPAT: U.S. CBP has to establish an export component 
of C-TPAT. This is to ensure that U.S. American export requirements of C-TPAT 
exporters comply with import requirements of AEO. 
Legal information exchange: The EU and the USA have to continue exchange 
of information on agreed channels in order to prevent delays. 
Legal framework: A legal framework for mutual recognition has to be 
established, and proper document drafts have to be written. The drafts then have to be 
endorsed and subsequently signed by both the EU and the USA. 
Member information sharing: A legal basis has to be established to share data 
of C-TPAT members to the EU even though earlier arrangements exist. 
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Joint verifications: Before implementing mutual recognition between the EU 
and the USA, participation in verification processes should be granted to one another. 
Benefits to the private sector: After implementation an evaluation shall be 
conducted to understand practical benefits of AEO's and C-TPAT's mutual recognition. 
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In this section the author presents the results of interviews conducted with port 
authorities. This is especially interesting as port authorities have a holistic viewpoint on 
business operations across the entire port – including facility operating companies and 
carriers – but also have contact to port customs. 
H>=>= L/%)'8Q&8,+!,5!@(2Q./!#<&C,'8&8/%!
The Port of Rotterdam is Europe's leading port. With 387 mn tons and 9.74 mn 
TEU annually it occupies the first place in both general cargo as well as in container 
throughput in Europe. It is rated fourth in the world's top ports, and 10th in the world's 
top container ports list. The port occupies 10,570 ha in total. It generates approximately 
500 mn EUR turnover yearly. Soon, the port will be extended by 20% (Maasvlakte 2) 
(Port of Rotterdam, 2010, pp. 9, 11, 15, 16). 
Origin/Destination 
 
Cargo in t  Containers in TEU 
Europe 43.68% 34.86% 
Africa 12.40% 2.71% 
Americas (incl. USA) 22.29% 16.77% 
USA 5.86% 8.14% 
Asia 19.19% 45.21% 
Oceania 2.36% 0.45% 
Others 0.04%  
Total 100% 100% 
Table 26: Cargo statistics 2008 by origin and destination in Port of Rotterdam 
(Source: Port of Rotterdam, 2010, pp. 9, 11, 15, 16) 
The table above shows the breakdown of inbound and outbound cargo at the port 
of Rotterdam. Slightly over eight per cent of containers arriving at or departing from 
Rotterdam have the USA as the destination or origin. 
The Port of Antwerp in Belgium is the second biggest freight port in Europe and 
seventh biggest worldwide. In 2009 the port handled 157.8 mn t of general cargo (Port 
of Antwerp, 2010a). In the same year, 7.31 mn TEUs were handled (Port of Antwerp, 
2010b, p. 1). 
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The port has a considerable petrochemical cluster with seven of the top ten 
chemical companies operating production facilities onsite (Port of Antwerp, 2010c). 
Rank 
 
Country t in mn Share 
1 USA 17.06 10.81% 
2 UK 11.04 7.00% 
3 Turkey 9.84 6.24% 
4 Russia 9.07 5.75% 
5 Brazil 7.61 4.82% 
7 China 5.60 3.55% 
9 Canada 5.11 3.24% 
20 Mexico 2.44 1.55% 
Table 27: Top destinations in 2009 including NAFTA region 
(Source: own creation after Port of Antwerp, 2010d, p. 1) 
As suggested by the table above, in Antwerp the top destination is clearly the 
USA, with a share of nearly 11%.  
Interviews were conducted with Jan Barendregt, Senior Business Manager at 
Rotterdam Port Authority, who is involved in hinterland inspection and customs, and 
also acts as an intermediate between the port, colleagues and other authorities, and 
Rik Verhaegen, the Head of Port Security at the Port Authority of Antwerp. 
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Motivation: ISPS had to be implemented in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam 
due to the legal environment (Verhaegen, 2010) and (Barendregt, 2010).  
ISPS: In practice, the ISPS is mostly about risk analysis and about general 
procedures for making up a security plan of facilities and ships. There is no explicit 
reference to hardware. The main objective is to analyze the risks, quantify them and, 
based on that, create a security plan (Verhaegen, 2010). 
The main task of the port authority was to coordinate ISPS certification in the 
whole port, and check compliance. For the implementation process a consulting 
company was contracted to conduct a general assessment of security in 2003 and 
2004. A Dutch web-based software toolkit called ISPS toolbox 
(www.portsecuritytoolkit.com) was used to create security plans and to ease the 
process of implementation. The Belgian ports have bought the license to distribute the 
software package, and almost all facilities then used this toolkit for implementation. 
According to the Port Authority of Antwerp, the user interface of this web application 
could be improved and is not very user-friendly, so alternative means of 
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communication were also used to learn about the compliance and the competition of 
the security plan of port facilities. For instance, the security plans generated by the 
ISPS toolkit had to be provided to the port authority in hard copy and digitally by every 
company. The port authority then reviewed the personalized documents and made 
suggestions for improvements (Verhaegen, 2010). 
The first facilities in the Port of Antwerp received ISPS certification in June 2004. 
Therefore, in 2009 a wave of audits for the renewal of certification took place, resulting 
in the renewal of 63 certificates. In the port, 84 port facilities are holders of an ISPS 
certification (Verhaegen, 2010). 
When ISPS was introduced, certain existing standards and security programs 
that had already been implemented had a positive effect. Synergies could be used, as 
the high requirements of petro-chemical companies for instance had already covered 
aspects of ISPS (such as a general security program, registration, access and 
movement control, etc). Some companies already had surveillance, which then did not 
have to be installed extra in order to comply with ISPS (Verhaegen, 2010). 
The Port of Rotterdam introduced ISPS between 2001 and 2002. According to 
the Port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands has been a leading country in matters of newly 
introduced security programs. The port authority itself mostly had coordinating tasks 
during implementation (Barendregt, 2010).  
A software package was developed together with the accountancy firm KPMG, 
enabling the companies in the port to conduct self-assessments. The result of the 
questionnaire to be completed was a report detailing the status of the inquirer. Based 
on the information supplied by the application, companies could equip themselves in 
order to become ISPS-compliant (Barendregt, 2010). 
AEO: The Port Authority of Rotterdam regards AEO as important. It is generally 
beneficial if the majority of actors in a port have a certification. However, it is not the 
task of the port authority to require certification from the individual actors (Barendregt, 
2010).  
CSI: The Netherlands was the first country in the European Union with an 
agreement on CSI in 2002. Every terminal has been equipped with CSI gates. The set-
up of the gates was done quickly and quietly and at no cost to the Port Authority 
(Barendregt, 2010). 
In Antwerp and Zeebrugge, CSI has been operational since 2002. Three to four 
customs officers from U.S. CBP are located in Antwerp in order to target high-risk 
containers. They operate closely with Belgian customs. CSI is solely implemented by 
the customs authority. If U.S. CBP officers are alerted by suspicious data, they need to 
consult Belgian customs officers in order to decide on further action. If it is decided to 
screen or inspect cargo physically, the Belgian officers will have to carry out the task. 
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They then report the outcomes to the U.S. CBP officers located in Antwerp 
(Verhaegen, 2010). 
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Security programs in general: For the Port Authority of Rotterdam the most 
important benefit is the marketability of security programs. It has been a very important 
sales argument, and can be used very successfully for marketing purposes. This 
includes the smooth flow of cargo, less delay, and the fact that only secure cargo 
leaves the port. However this advantage is vanishing as more and more ports operate 
on the same standards. Therefore competitive advantages in this regard are 
disappearing, but the fact that the Port of Rotterdam has always been a pioneer in 
matters of security is still very important when it comes to marketing. Another 
marketing tool is the very close relation between the Port Authority and the Custom 
office (Barendregt, 2010).  
In general, Dutch customs are an extremely reliable partner for the businesses 
organizing their logistics, be it import or export, through the Port of Rotterdam 
(Barendregt, 2010). 
The security measures that are being introduced are generally beneficial as they 
enhance security throughout transportation. It is expected that after a period of time the 
understanding of security and the approach to it will change totally. Instead of 
inspecting cargo at the port of arrival, these activities – including X-ray scans, detection 
of nuclear material, reports etc. – will be shifted to the port of departure. AEO certainly 
plays an important role in this process (Barendregt, 2010). 
As the Netherlands has generally implemented security requirements very 
quickly, this in turn has led to a competitive advantage. 
ISPS: Since the introduction of ISPS, criminal actions such as the stealing of 
cargo, materials and trucks have decreased and also organized crime has become 
more difficult, but has not vanished totally. With the implementation of ISPS, a tighter 
organization, improved operational management and an optimized flow of cargo within 
the port has occurred – which is a big advantage when trading with the USA 
(Verhaegen, 2010). 
For the port authority there is no disadvantage or hindrance from ISPS 
(Verhaegen, 2010).  
AEO: Theoretically, AEO promises benefits for the actors. In practice, however, 
there were until recently very few advantages if any. First and only recent examples 
 ! ! TP 
 
are the smoother handling of cargos within the port and the reduced customs bond 
(Barendregt, 2010).  
It appears that the concretization of AEO benefits is not yet worked out fully. 
According to the Port Authority of Rotterdam, this might result from the fact that AEO is 
not centrally coordinated, but that every single country has its own set of rules, 
requirements and benefits offered. Furthermore, it appears that AEO-C and AEO-S do 
not grant benefits to the actors. AEO-F in contrast has little influence on customs 
clearance. In addition, in the Netherlands, holders of an AEO-F certificate may enjoy 
the benefit of a lower customs bond, if any. Overall benefits might be small, but in 
practice every single benefit granted is advantageous for businesses (Barendregt, 
2010). 
The Port of Antwerp receives very general feedback from the industry on AEO. It 
appears that companies have mixed feelings about the program. One advantage of the 
AEO that has not yet been announced by the EU is green lanes. There are already 
green lanes in operation between Antwerp and South Africa – however this program 
operates on a different basis (Verhaegen, 2010). 
CSI: CSI does not generally hinder the flow of cargo in Antwerp. Megaports also 
does not hinder any trade, as trucks can pass it at the entrance of the port at normal 
speed (Verhaegen, 2010). 
Detection systems: Detection does not provide any direct benefits, but on the 
other hand it does not interfere with the seamless flow of truck and rail containers 
either. Containers may pass the detection gates at a speed of 20 km/h. In the past 
there have been false alerts due to the natural radiation of certain products (like 
broccoli). However these false alarms could be bypassed by the intelligence of the 
gates, which are in a position to recognize the container number and compare it with 
the manifest database (Barendregt, 2010). 
100% X-ray inspection: Due to the huge number of containers being shipped 
from Rotterdam to the USA it would be a great challenge to implement X-ray scanning 
of each and every container designated for the United States. With the expansion of 
Rotterdam (300% of actual throughput), it would be impossible to do so. Also it is 
known in the industry that no port would have the possibility of really and reliably 
scanning 100% of cargo. Despite this fact, the Port of Rotterdam regards high-volume 
scanning as feasible and also of high importance. To prepare for the expected increase 
of container volumes passing through X-ray scanning, the Dutch customs is currently 
building an X-ray scanner for railways, which will be capable of scanning containers 
driving though at a speed of 60 km/h. The 100% X-ray scanning is still being 
discussed. Reference is made to the recent report made by the General Accounting 
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Office42, which judged the cost as not being in proportion to the anticipated benefits. 
Although not at all being in favor of 100% scanning (the stance taken by EU customs), 
Rotterdam will have to implement systems enabling such inspections (Barendregt, 
2010). 
According to the Port of Antwerp, the big question regarding 100% scanning 
within the industry is why countries should make the effort to conduct such a resource-
consuming program for another country. Implementation of 100% screening will be 
problematic, and will the same service be provided for the countries importing from the 
U.S.? Above all is the question of whether 100% scanning will be of any added value 
compared to a risk-based layered system. The general plan of introducing the program 
by 2012 might not be possible, according to Rik Verhaegen. The U.S. is currently in 
search of other (faster) possibilities of scanning. Theoretically, equipment could be 
produced that can take usable images at higher speed, however these may not be 
allowed by current health regulations in the EU (Verhaegen, 2010). 
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ISPS: For the Port Authority of Rotterdam, the costs of ISPS implementation can 
be categorized into the development costs for the web application and personnel costs 
(Barendregt, 2010).  
In general, the costs for ISPS cannot be isolated from other security-relevant 
expenditures and ISO certification, as many of the security measures for different 
programs are being carried out jointly or in a parallel way – including environmental 
measures and measures for hazardous goods. Security costs would exist anyway, so 
there is no need and no possibility to measure them separately. According to the Port 
Authority of Rotterdam, it would be surprising if a port of that size could not deal with 
the expenditures of additionally required security requirements. The implementation of 
ISPS reportedly did not require any company to mobilize any more resources than an 
ISO certification (Barendregt, 2010). 
For the Port of Antwerp there are no direct costs that could be accounted for by 
the implementation of ISPS. A rough estimate is 200,000 EUR. For the port authority 
itself, these costs derived from the team of the security department, where four people 
are permanently working on ISPS (Head of Security, Assistant and two Controllers). 
This team has conducted 242 audits on a five-year basis. The team itself consists of 
                                                
42
 Refers to report GAO-10-1041T and corresponding reports GAO-08-533T and GAO-10-12 (to be 
retrieved via http://www.gao.gov/). 
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people who had been working at the port authority before implementation. However, 
new staff had to be found to fill their previous positions (Verhaegen, 2010). 
Mostly the companies operating certain facilities in the port had to bear the costs 
of implementation (Verhaegen, 2010). 
Security drills that are carried out four times a year may result in increased 
workloads. These security drills are carried out on a quarterly basis. An annual 
exercise also has to be carried out. Certainly some components of annual security 
expenditures due to ISPS can be measured: The cost of 24/7 security guarding may be 
as high as 30,000 EUR monthly in Belgium (Verhaegen, 2010). 
According to the Port Authority of Rotterdam, the U.S. American security 
measures – such as C-TPAT, CSI and the 24-Hour Rule – now work very well and 
seamlessly. However it was said to be a major effort for logistics providers and 
consignors to comply with them (Barendregt, 2010). 
CSI: There were and are no costs for the Port Authority of Rotterdam, as the 
whole set-up and operation is financed by U.S. CBP. There is a strong cooperation 
between U.S. CBP and Dutch Customs' officers that works seamlessly. All in all, CSI is 
a very administrative program (Barendregt, 2010).  
Image and radiation scanners in Antwerp belong to the Belgian authorities. The 
Megaports equipment, which is closely related to CSI, was set up by U.S. CBP entirely, 
but is operated by Belgian customs. The extra effort for companies lies in another 
program that provides basic data to CSI – the 24-Hour Advance Manifest Rule 
(Verhaegen, 2010). 
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All in all, the Port of Rotterdam is keeping security up to date and within the port 
complex state-of-the-art security equipment is in use. The Port of Rotterdam regards 
security as extremely important, and an area where improvements certainly have to be 
made continuously. However, the complex and cross-linked security requirements, 
standards and voluntary programs demand a high amount of resources. What makes it 
even harder for companies is the fact that there is no possibility to stop the security 
mania globally – with all the drawbacks and benefits this may result in (Barendregt, 
2010). 
According to Rik Verhaegen, terrorist attacks are more likely in maritime liner 
services (such as container, Ro-Ro) than bulk shipping. This is because the arrivals 
and departures in the liner environment are on a regular basis. If it can be assumed 
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that possible terrorist attacks are planned, so terrorists would certainly prefer liner 
shipping as the location and time is more predictable (Verhaegen, 2010). 
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In this section the author presents practical insights from two carriers’ points of 
view and gives a short description of the sample companies interviewed. 
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Maersk Line is the maritime container carrier division of A.P. Moller-Maersk 
Group, which is one of the top three companies in the transportation industry worldwide 
(Fraunhofer IIS, 2009). 
Maersk Line is present in more than 125 countries. The company operates over 
500 vessels and 1,900,000 containers. Operating worldwide it had a net revenue of 
28,666 million USD in the fiscal year of 2008 (Maersk Line, 2010a). In 2006 the 
company took delivery of the world’s largest container ship (PS-type vessel), called 
Emma Maersk, with a carrying capacity of over 11,000 TEU and a gross tonnage of 
151,687. Seven sister ships followed (Maersk Line, 2010b) and (Maersk Line, 2010c). 
The latest awards received by the company in 2009 include the "Best Global Shipping 
Line", "Best Shipping Line for Asia-Europe" and "Best Green Service Provider – 
Shipping Line". (Maersk Line, 2010d) 
Hamburg Süd is a Germany-based sea carrier with its headquarters in Hamburg. 
It operates 96 container vessels and 52 tramps and a stock of 338,795 containers. 
Total carryings in 2009 amounted to 2,330,000 TEU. The company has generated 
3,193 mn EUR in sales (2009) (Hamburg Süd, 2010). 
The interviews were conducted with Mr. Lars Lorenzen, Head of Security at 
Maersk Line (AEO and C-TPAT), Mr. Martin Bräun, Marketing-Customer Order 
Management at the Hamburg Süd headquarters (AEO) and Mr. Rainer Dehe, Director 
Operations at Hamburg Süd North America (C-TPAT). 
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Motivation and expected benefits: Maerks Line found AEO certification 
essential due to market pressure. The company did not expect any direct benefits from 
AEO; however, as it has been required by clients, certification was taken into 
consideration (Lorenzen, 2010).  
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The main motivation for Hamburg Süd to receive AEO certification is pressure 
from the market. Beginning in 2008, the company has repeatedly received requests 
from some partners, stating that in order to continue business, the company would 
need to get an AEO certificate, or it should sign a security declaration. Clearly, in such 
a case certification might pay off, as this can be published and used for marketing 
purposes. Another incentive for participation in the program was the theoretical 
concept of the green lane principle with fewer inspections, advance notification of 
inspections, reduced datasets for ENS and alleviation in matters of customs bonds 
(Bräun, 2010). 
Similar to the motivation for AEO, the U.S. branch of Hamburg Süd considered 
participation in the voluntary C-TPAT program as the only possibility to retain business 
in the U.S. Not only were all carriers strongly encouraged to participate in the program, 
but also customers required carriers to take part in C-TPAT. One of the main presumed 
benefits is the decrease in the frequency of time-consuming container inspections 
(Dehe, 2010). 
Shorty after the introduction of C-TPAT, Maersk Line recognized that 
participation in the program is essential for carriers in order to operate successfully 
within the industry. The company itself did not see any direct benefits from C-TPAT as 
a carrier, but rather had to get involved due to U.S. importers who have contractually 
required C-TPAT membership (Lorenzen, 2010). 
Preparation and implementation (AEO): After receiving the approval of the 
executive board, Hamburg Süd started the application process for AEO-F certification. 
Branches in the Netherlands, Belgium and United Kingdom have already been audited 
by the local customs authority in summer 2010. The German audit is expected to be 
performed in November 2010 (Bräun, 2010). 
The first step for Hamburg Süd was to fill out the AEO questionnaire and send it 
back to the German customs authority in Hamburg. As the form is complex and in parts 
difficult to understand, in addition to the two employees of Hamburg Süd, a team of two 
external experts was consulted. The expert team consisting of a law firm (Graf von 
Westphalen) and a customs broker (Porath Customs Agent) assisted the company 
during the entire preparation process with their advice, assistance in the compilation of 
the questionnaire and contact to Hamburg customs authorities (Bräun, 2010). 
According to Hamburg Süd, for the AEO only small details had to be changed or 
adjusted. Physical access controls in the office had been already implemented before 
AEO – there are no warehouses operated by Hamburg Süd. Many procedures and 
internal security already existed as required by AEO; they only had to be written down 
in more detail. As the company is already ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and ISPS certified, 
many security measures were already implemented at earlier stages. References to 
those certifications could be specified in the questionnaire. All in all, participation in 
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other security programs and standards proved to be very helpful for AEO (Bräun, 
2010). 
The company started to prepare for the program in mid-2007 and finally 
submitted the documents to the Danish customs authority in early 2008. The company 
has applied for the program by legal entities in around 10 member states of the 
European Union, as AEO requires all legal players to apply separately. Therefore 
receiving the AEO certificate was a significant undertaking. Even though the company 
had a very good communication with the Danish customs authority, they have realized 
that each member state has a different approach to the certification process. For 
instance, the British customs authority (HMRC) has clearly the strictest approach to 
AEO certification. This, according to Maersk Line, is beneficial for the community but 
requires more intense preparation from the company's point of view. The Danish 
customs authority in contrast appears to have a more relaxed approach to the AEO 
certification process. The reason for implementing AEO was more a matter of keeping 
the company up to date, being amongst the first-comers and waiting for benefits that 
might evolve later (Lorenzen, 2010). 
Preparation and implementation (C-TPAT): Hamburg Süd USA implemented 
C-TPAT in 2002. Similarly to AEO, not too many changes had to be made, as the 
majority of the vaguely worded C-TPAT requirements had been industry practice by 
that time. Especially ISPS coincided with C-TPAT requirements. Additionally, security 
measures that have been introduced onboard of vessels and at terminals by Hamburg 
Süd earlier assisted in demonstrating compliance with C-TPAT. For C-TPAT 
implementation no external experts were consulted (Dehe, 2010). 
At Maersk Line, C-TPAT validation process was the New-Jersey-based U.S. 
subsidiary's and the HQ-based security department's task. The U.S. subsidiary 
however had a significant duty in communications with U.S. CBP – every piece of 
information passed through New Jersey in order to minimize the possibility of 
misunderstandings. Communication with U.S. CBP was unexpectedly simple and 
pleasant. U.S. CBP readily listens and incorporates recommendations from the 
industry associations and even individual companies (Lorenzen, 2010). 
The company group started to enroll in C-TPAT in spring 2003 and received the 
allowance to receive C-TPAT membership in the same year. The validation process 
took place in three different parts of the business unit at three facilities geographically 
far apart from each other – the headquarters in Copenhagen (main facilities), a 
subsidiary in New Jersey (U.S. facilities) and facilities in Indonesia (foreign facilities). 
Through these processes the facility set-ups and procedures were analyzed. Finally, in 
2004 the company group received six C-TPAT validations. The joint application was 
not a problem at all, as the individual companies share a number of facilities. In 2006 
when C-TPAT was updated the group had to go through a revalidation process, where 
a new security profile had to be developed (Lorenzen, 2010). 
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C-TPAT benefits: As mentioned above, Maerks Line does not have any direct 
benefits from participating in C-TPAT but rather sees it as a necessity in the industry. 
Also, interestingly, it did not make any difference in business operations whether the 
company was only enrolled or validated for C-TPAT. Two indirect benefits were 
highlighted by Maersk. Firstly was the first mover advantage: the earlier a company 
could comply with C-TPAT, the easier it was to sign contracts with U.S.-based 
companies that have contractually required C-TPAT membership. Secondly, the 
concept of C-TPAT has helped to organize the company's thoughts regarding security. 
One can say that the current internal security program is mainly based on C-TPAT and 
ISPS (Lorenzen, 2010). 
C-TPAT disadvantages: In contrast to the benefits offered by the program, 
disadvantages – or rather risks – of C-TPAT also have to be taken into account, 
according to Maersk Line. The only risk observed by the company is the risk of failing 
to comply with the requirements. In such a case this would be made public and the 
business unit might be suspended from membership temporarily or perhaps even 
permanently. A competitor for instance repeatedly had stowaways in containers. U.S. 
CBP found that the company had inadequate security measures and suspended the 
member for two weeks. These events might occur at any time, as even with very strict 
security measures unexpected occurrences might happen that are beyond the 
company’s control. The main problem with such exclusions is that as soon as one is 
temporarily expelled, contracts might be withdrawn and as a result cargo might be lost 
to competitors (Lorenzen, 2010). 
Mixed feelings about AEO: According to Maersk Line, just like C-TPAT, AEO 
does not give any benefits for carriers in practice. Also, business partners do not 
require it yet. However, it can be said that the concept of AEO has helped the business 
to organize security-related thoughts, just like C-TPAT did (Lorenzen, 2010). 
Hamburg Süd is not yet in position to specify actual benefits and disadvantages 
arising from AEO, as certification has not been implemented yet. However, the degree 
of actual benefits is still unclear: If by and by every company keeps up with security 
trends, eventually the relative benefits may decline. AEO then might become more like 
an industry standard. Also in such a case it would be uncertain whether a green lane 
could be meaningful (Bräun, 2010).  
All in all, participation in a number of (security) programs and standards such as 
ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISPS, C-TPAT and in future AEO is certainly well marketable as 
it proves the company’s concern about supply chain security, according to Hamburg 
Süd (Bräun, 2010).  
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Some changes and additions had to be made in order to comply with C-TPAT 
and AEO. Facility Security Officers (FSO) had to be appointed and trained, additional 
security assessments and security plans had to be created and a database for 
security-relevant documents and information was set up. For Maersk Line it is not at all 
possible to determine implementation costs and running/maintaining costs of the 
security programs, as the company would have undertaken continuous improvements 
in security anyway. However an approximation of the implementation costs was less 
than 0.5 mn USD. Costs cannot be considered for the account of C-TPAT or AEO, but 
as general security expenditures. Workload has not significantly increased in either 
implementation processes or in the daily operation (Lorenzen, 2010). 
For Hamburg Süd, the main costs associated with AEO were those of external 
experts, as no physical changes in facilities had to be made (Bräun, 2010). 
Clearly, the process of AEO certification resulted in an increased workload at 
Hamburg Süd. It took approximately 8–9 months part-time work of two employees with 
the help of external experts to complete the AEO questionnaire, including internal 
information gathering and setting up procedures where required. The actual audits also 
required additional time. In future, every change regarding information provided in the 
questionnaire will have to be communicated to the customs authority (Bräun, 2010).  
According to Hamburg Süd, the only identifiable costs for C-TPAT are those of 
travel in conjunction with the validation process. The same applies for revalidation. 
These visits include ports where cargo destined for the U.S. is loaded (Dehe, 2010). 
It took much longer to understand the concept of AEO and also required more 
work from the financial, customs compliance and legal points of view says Lars 
Lorenzen from Maersk Line. However, actual costs cannot be measured separately 
(Lorenzen, 2010). 
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Focus on security and structure: All in all, Maersk Line perceives the programs 
to complement each other in a certain way. Whereas C-TPAT covers the entire supply 
chain in matters of security (including personnel, procedure and physical security), 
AEO focuses more on the financial and tax-related issues. However, it has to be 
mentioned that C-TPAT does not have export requirements, whereas AEO does. In 
addition, ISPS covers a certain segment of the supply chain, namely port and ship 
security, more strictly than any of the other programs mentioned (Lorenzen, 2010). 
 ! ! VH 
 
AEO was set up by taxation and customs experts. Therefore it has a much 
stronger focus on tax and customs compliance and less on security. Even though AEO 
tries to incorporate taxation, security and safety, it appears to be hardly possible to do 
so – as any committee has an expertise in a different field. In contrast, C-TPAT solely 
focuses on security, and therefore has a much clearer guideline. AEO is still not as well 
developed as C-TPAT is. Also, in some cases, AEO lacks adequate security 
requirements. The weaknesses of AEO that the program has to cope with might be a 
result of the three-layer design (WCO/EU/member state) and the lack of coordination 
between the member states (Lorenzen, 2010). Hamburg Süd understands that for the 
EU the development of homogeneous security programs throughout the entire Union is 
a very challenging task not only due to the structure and different legal prerequisites 
but also due to communication problems based on different languages (Bräun, 2010). 
According to Maersk Line, especially for groups it takes a lot of effort to multiply 
apply for AEO (the program requires every legal entity to receive its own certificate) 
(Lorenzen, 2010). 
According to Hamburg Süd, the interpretation of AEO requirements and 
scrupulousness during the application process seems to vary between various EU 
customs authorities (Bräun, 2010).  
Communication: AEO has a poorer communication than C-TPAT. This has two 
impacts from a company's point of view: On the one hand, it is harder for businesses to 
find adequate information on how to implement AEO and which tangible benefits it has 
to offer. On the other hand, AEO is less well-known in the industry worldwide than C-
TPAT is. This might also be the case due to the omnipresence of C-TPAT in the 
industry as well as the requirement of C-TPAT to communicate certification and the 
program to business partners. Also when it comes to feedback C-TPAT appears to 
have a much more open relation to businesses: Companies can make suggestions to 
U.S. CBP directly or though industry associations at certain events. Maersk sends 
employees from the U.S. American subsidiary to these events – the impression is that 
U.S. CBP really listens to suggestions from the industry and that there is an ongoing 
dialogue. According to the company, AEO does not provide such an easy channel of 
communication and feedback (Lorenzen, 2010). 
Legal entities vs. business units: Another big difference between the programs 
is the approach to business units. AEO requires every single legal unit to apply for 
certification, which, in case of a huge group, can be quite problematic and resource 
consuming. Maersk for instance has around 200 legal entities in the EU alone – and 
even though it would not have made sense to certify every single company, the group 
so far has applied in approximately 10 member states for AEO certificates. In contrast, 
C-TPAT is directed towards business units. Therefore only six C-TPAT certificates 
were required for the entire group. The company only had to apply to U.S. CBP 
(Lorenzen, 2010). 
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Mutual recognition: According to Maersk, mutual recognition would be 
advantageous to businesses, but the process of harmonizing the customs-to-business 
programs might be very difficult due to the fact that in practice AEO and C-TPAT are 
quite different (Lorenzen, 2010). According to Hamburg Süd, mutual recognition might 
possibly result in a decrease of administration (Bräun, 2010). Apart from the possibility 
of conflicting requirements of the different required standards, no actual disadvantages 
could be identified (Dehe, 2010). 
First-comer advantage without direct benefits: All in all the message of 
Maersk appears to be that the first-comer advantage is indirect: Carriers do not benefit 
from the programs, but have to take it as a requirement from their partners' side. 
Therefore it is essential to apply for the security programs and receive membership 
and certification as soon as possible (Lorenzen, 2010). 
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In this section the author describes practical aspects of cargo security from two 
companies' points of view: The Austrian branch of a Germany-based company and the 
U.S. branch of an Austrian company. 
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DB Schenker, a Germany-based logistics provider with 15 bn EUR turnover, 
91,000 staff at 2,000 locations in approximately 130 countries, is a leading company 
worldwide in the logistics industry (DB Schenker, 2010a). 
Mode of Transportation 
 
Amount in Thousands Unit 
Land (Europe) 70,052 shipments 
Air 1,032 t 
Sea 1,424 TEU 
Table 28: DB Schenker statistics 2009 in thousands 
(Source: own creation after DB Schenker, 2010b) 
DB Schenker Austria is one of the biggest branches within the group and acts as 
regional head office for CEE and Southern Europe (DB Schenker, 2009 and DB 
Schenker, 2010c). 
Cargo Partner is an international freight forwarder and logistics provider with 
headquarters in Fischamend, Austria, and over 100 branches in 26 countries 
worldwide and a turnover of 345 mn EUR (Cargo Partner, 2010). 
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Mode of Transportation 
 
t in 2009 Share 
Air freight 86,000 t 5.42% 
Sea freight 908,000 t 57.25% 
Road freight/logistics 592.000 t 37.33% 
Total 1,586,000 t 100% 
Table 29: Breakdown of freight transported in 2009 by mode of transportation 
(Source: own creation after Cargo Partner, 2010) 
The interview was conducted with Mr. Martin Neuwirth, Safety Advisor at DB 
Schenker Austria, and Colleen Donahue, Compliance Manager at the U.S. branch of 
Cargo Partner in New York City (NYC), who inherited the entire C-TPAT project 
including implementation and compliance from another colleague. 
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Security before AEO and C-TPAT: The DB Schenker group was employing 
global security management according to ISO 28000 long before the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. It operates over a strict hierarchy from the group to regional and finally to country 
security managers. Before 2001 the group mostly focused on cargo security, with a 
focus on high-value and theft-prone goods, just as the entire industry did. Many 
standards and certificates such as TAPA had already been implemented by that time, 
which not only came with high implementation costs, but which also had operating 
costs (Neuwirth, 2010).  
In 2001 the approach to security changed in the entire industry. The focus shifted 
from "small criminality" like cargo theft to organized crime and terrorism. A new security 
system was required globally that did not only hinder criminals from removing from 
cargo, but also from adding to cargo. Many tools implemented globally were capable of 
dealing with new issues, but some were not. A large number of different programs 
were introduced worldwide – the first being initiatives in aviation with the regulated 
agent program (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Motivation and expected benefits: The main motivation of the U.S. branch of 
Cargo Partner to receive a C-TPAT certification was firstly the requirement of 
membership by some of its clients and secondly a very good marketability of the 
program. Another reason for the U.S. branch to volunteer for C-TPAT membership is 
patriotism, as through C-TPAT the overall U.S. security is enhanced (Donahue, 2010). 
Every company within the DB Schenker group has had to implement AEO-C 
(Neuwirth, 2010).  
 ! ! VT 
 
Preparation and implementation (AEO): The DB Schenker group set up a 
committee and knowledge pool for AEO certification in order to support implementation 
group-wide, however due to the differences in national AEO guidelines the branches 
had to handle the certification process themselves. Group-wide implementation of 
AEO-F was considered, however this plan was discarded after detailed legal and 
economic assessment. For legal analysis external experts were consulted, but for the 
implementation process no support from consulting companies was required (Neuwirth, 
2010). 
DB Schenker Austria received AEO-C certification in 2008. The implementation 
process was very simple, as all requirements had already been met by DB Schenker 
Austria before implementation. These included financial stability, creditworthiness and 
recent reliability in regard to customs encounters. Implementation was realized 
together with the customs division. Overall, nothing had to be changed in the company 
in order to comply with AEO-C. An application form was sent to the customs authority 
together with a self-assessment. A discussion with the Austrian customs authority 
followed – however due to the very frequent encounters with customs there were 
hardly any open questions (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Preparation and implementation (C-TPAT): Implementation of and compliance 
with C-TPAT for Cargo Partner NYC was quite time-consuming. Approximately one 
year was needed to prepare for participation. In May 2010 the U.S. branch applied for 
C-TPAT membership through the U.S. CBP website. One month later the company 
received the approval of acceptance from U.S. CBP. However Tier 1 status is still 
pending. It takes another 6–12 months for the U.S. CBP Validation Team to inspect the 
company's and possibly other facilities. After this validation the company might remain 
on Tier 1 or might be increased to Tier 2 status depending on the security level of the 
company's SC. Tier 2 status can even be reached with non-C-TPAT service providers 
that meet U.S. CBP security guidelines (Donahue, 2010). 
Not only internal, but also external assessments had to be conducted and 
appropriate measures had to be taken. Internal implementation included the 
assessment and change in human resource policy (including hiring and firing 
procedures), physical access policy, IT security and facility security. Processes had to 
be assessed and codified. In addition, all business partners and branches had to be 
assessed regarding security compliance. For this purpose a company newsletter with a 
voluntary online survey was sent out to 500 business partners across the entire supply 
chain, including warehouses, carriers, airlines, NVOCCs, clients, importers and 
exporters, agents and branches. The company received responses from 40 business 
partners and 50% of their agents and branches. (Donahue, 2010) 
Cargo Partner NYC incorporated an external consultant into the preparation, 
application and implementation process. He provided sample documents and 
guidelines, and explained procedures and policies more in detail. However the 
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company could acquire most of the information via the Internet. Throughout the whole 
certification process communications with U.S. CBP were very responsive (Donahue, 
2010). 
DB Schenker Austria is not C-TPAT certified, however the branch of the DB 
Schenker Group in the USA is (Neuwirth, 2010). 
DB Schenker Austria received a request from DB Schenker USA to fill out a 
compliance questionnaire regarding C-TPAT. Even though DB Schenker Austria does 
comply with C-TPAT requirements, it has not completed the questionnaire for privacy 
reasons. C-TPAT membership of the US-based branch is not affected by the Austrian 
company not completing the questionnaire. Also, the Austrian company has already 
been audited on-site by one of its clients, Boeing, which required C-TPAT compliance. 
Even though DB Schenker Austria has not processed the C-TPAT questionnaire, 
audits in Austria have been conducted by the client with positive results (Neuwirth, 
2010).  
Some other branches of the DB Schenker group in other EU member states (for 
instance in the Czech Republic) have answered the C-TPAT questionnaire as required 
by DB Schenker USA. Audits have also been conducted by DB Schenker USA in those 
branches. This was mainly done due to pressure from the market (Neuwirth, 2010). 
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C-TPAT benefits: The main benefit for the U.S. branch of Cargo Partner is 
clearly marketability. Not many of the clients are C-TPAT members themselves. Even if 
clients are not C-TPAT certified, they would still rather contract a C-TPAT member than 
a company without corresponding security standards. However, 35–45% of trucking 
providers and many of the VOCCs and airlines are C-TPAT certified. Carriers that are 
not C-TPAT certified do maintain a level of external and internal security that are most 
likely acceptable to U.S. CBP (Donahue, 2010).  
Cargo Partner as a freight forwarder does not receive any direct benefits from its 
C-TPAT membership. It is mainly importers and shippers who receive benefits from C-
TPAT membership (Donahue, 2010). 
C-TPAT disadvantages: Cargo Partner NYC has to ensure it does business with 
C-TPAT compliant companies, or at least with companies that have a certain level of 
security as a result of other programs or internal business policy. Therefore the 
company might lose business to non-certified companies that do not maintain security 
policies at all. Therefore Cargo Partner NYC encourages those to participate in C-
TPAT (Donahue, 2010). 
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have changed the entire transportation and logistics 
industry in the United States. Due to the new, tough regulations and programs, many 
small truckers and freight forwarders have disappeared from the market as a result of 
financially not being able to comply. In contrast, larger companies were in a position to 
respond more easily to the changes in the environment – however even they were hit 
hard and challenged (Donahue, 2010). 
AEO benefits: For DB Schenker, the AEO-C certificate had a very positive 
impact group-wide. The implementation of AEO-C in the entire EU resulted in a 
homogeneous and more structured approach to customs procedures and customs 
clearance. AEO-F has been implemented in several countries, including Germany. The 
incentives for applying for AEO-F are firstly the anticipated benefits that at present do 
not exist, and secondly marketability. However the marketability is questionable; as no 
actual benefits are granted to the logistics provider, obviously no benefits can be 
passed on to customers. Overall, it was still important to implement AEO-F, as more 
competitors have applied for AEO-F in Germany (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Even though DB Schenker Austria does not have an AEO-F certificate, it has not 
lost any clients as a result. Even if clients required certification in the first place, after a 
detailed conversation about the main focus of security, business could be proceeded 
just like before the existence of AEO-F. It is important to understand that it is not a 
certificate that is crucial but rather the security measures themselves – and these are 
implemented anyway (Neuwirth, 2010). 
AEO disadvantages: According to DB Schenker Austria, AEO also has 
drawbacks. One of the main risks of an AEO-F certificate is liability. If any intrusion or 
modification appears with cargo being handled by a company that is AEO-F certified, 
the company is fully liable for the damages resulting from the criminal event. This is 
especially problematic as from the practical point of view it is not possible to entirely 
prevent such unexpected events. On the other hand, if a company has set up internal 
security measures that conform with AEO-F requirements, but certification has not 
been applied for, liability may be lower even though the same level of security is 
provided by the company (Neuwirth, 2010).  
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C-TPAT-related costs: The physical changes for access restriction in Cargo 
Partner’s NYC office amounted to approximately 6,200 USD (Donahue, 2010). 
For the U.S. branch of Cargo Partner, compliance with C-TPAT requires the full-
time work of one person. This includes communications with partners, surveying, 
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controlling, developing and changing existing security standards and the retraining of 
the workforce as well as partners (Donahue, 2010). 
AEO-related costs: For DB Schenker Austria, the implementation of AEO-C was 
not resource intensive. The costs for AEO-C implementation were very low. Only a few 
meetings and an undefined, yet very low, number of working hours were needed for 
implementation. Also, nothing had to be changed for AEO-C within the company, so no 
investment costs were occurred. Daily business operation has not been affected by the 
implementation of AEO-C, as existing processes did not need to be changed 
(Neuwirth, 2010). 
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Mutual recognition: Generally, both programs have the same goal, but with a 
different approach. This is mostly reflected in the questionnaires provided by both 
programs. Neither the EU nor the USA seems to be willing to change their approach 
(Neuwirth, 2010). 
As in practice C-TPAT companies accept AEO compliance and vice versa, 
mutual recognition would not have a big impact on certified companies' business, 
without accompanying amendments of requirements (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Position on governmental security programs: Programs like regulated agents 
in aviation, AEO-S, AEO-F and C-TPAT have been strongly rejected by the industry as 
they have clearly shifted national responsibility in regard to security against organized 
criminality and unlimited liability to businesses. Businesses are expected to voluntarily 
cover a field of responsibility that is not possible to be covered by companies but rather 
governments (Neuwirth, 2010). 
AEO and C-TPAT also do not seem to achieve their main goal. Even though 
these programs may enhance security, terrorism per se cannot be fought by programs 
that are built on the basis of vague elements and consist mainly of bureaucracy. Also, if 
there is a system that criminals and terrorists can follow, it would make criminal actions 
easier to plan. Both programs should be planned by authorities with higher precision 
and more details and know-how (Neuwirth, 2010). 
In addition, it is questionable whether for different types of goods (food, high-
value goods, construction material, etc.) a single and homogeneous security approach 
can be used (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Governmental security programs such as C-TPAT and AEO are very hard to 
implement for companies operating in a network. A single factory can accomplish 
compliance with security programs more easily, as only one facility has to meet 
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requirements. However companies operating in a network (such as logistics providers) 
need to make the entire network of partners compliant (Neuwirth, 2010). 
However, security programs do becalm people due to their existence, even if in 
practice they are not capable of securing the supply chain to the extent promoted in 
theory (Neuwirth, 2010). 
General reservations against AEO-F/C-TPAT: One of the main aspects of AEO 
and C-TPAT are detailed documentation of business processes and security including 
HR. Whenever data is submitted to a third party (be it another business or 
governmental authority), misuse may occur. This again could disclose sensitive internal 
data to unauthorized individuals. As certainty about security measures and internal 
processes within a company is the easiest way for a third (criminal) person to by-pass 
security, criminal acts may be easier to organize. Thus, as soon as the submission of 
sensitive internal data to a third party is required, security is questionable. This again 
conflicts with the aims of AEO and C-TPAT (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Moreover, as both programs require a very extensive control of HR activities, it is 
practically impossible to have fundamental knowledge about every single worker of 
each and every subcontractor of the widely operating company. DB Schenker has 
more than 4,000 subcontractors in Austria alone (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Position on AEO: Also, the AEO program has been created and rolled out by 
customs authorities and customs experts, but it intends to have an impact on customs 
and security. As security-related knowledge is highly unincisive, it needs a longer time 
to actually mature. Guidelines are coherent but vague. In addition, AEO has a different 
approach to the certification process in every member state. Guidelines differ – 
customs authorities seem to be very exact in some cases and casual in others. AEO 
has not yet proved to be a success story in Europe (Neuwirth, 2010). 
Fundamental problem with security: The supply chain (or any other process) 
can only be as secure as its weakest link. As especially in the supply chain numerous 
people are involved, it is hardly possible to avoid security leaks without excessive 
money and time investments. People carrying out very operative tasks for low pay 
(such as warehousemen and truck drivers) may be easier to entrap for criminal actions. 
It is of high importance to create a security system with as few leaks as possible, but it 
is impossible to fully secure the entire supply chain against any type of intrusion 
(Neuwirth, 2010).  
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The following sections provide answers to the research questions based on desk 
research and the conducted interviews. Other interesting aspects are also considered. 
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Which security programs apply when transporting between the EU and the 
USA, how are they securing and facilitating trade, and what is their status quo? 
The author has identified a number of security programs applying to shipments 
from the European Union to the United States and vice versa.  
In the European Union, the EC's Regulation No. 648/2005 is responsible for 
security updates within the Union, and puts the focus on the two core elements of 
cargo security: A mutual information system and the AEO. The mutual information 
system on the one hand should create a single-window approach to cargo information, 
including import, transit and export of goods, and thus give customs authorities a 
transparent overview of all shipments originating in and/or destined for the EU. On the 
other hand, the AEO is intended to help facilitate trade by granting economic operators 
the status of a low-risk actor if certain requirements are met. In return for the operators' 
efforts in voluntarily setting higher standards within the company, certain benefits are 
granted. 
In the United States, the MTSA provides the framework for a number of security 
programs, such as the SAFE Port Act. This again has codified the actual 
implementation of security programs and offices, such as C-TPAT, CSI and others. In 
the USA the 24-Hour Advance Manifest Rule ensures that the datasets of shipments 
arriving in the United States are analyzed by the ATS in order to filter out high-risk 
cargo. The ISF later intensified the 24-Hour Rule. Other initiatives that analyze and 
inspect cargo, such as CSI and SFI, have been introduced at foreign ports. They have 
successfully shifted the security measures of the United States offshore. C-TPAT was 
set up in order to facilitate trade. This voluntary security program, similarly to AEO, 
assigns to certified companies a lower risk score, resulting in a number of benefits. C-
TPAT certified importers can additionally apply for ISA, which will grant further benefits 
to importers specifically. 
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If there is an overlap between the programs, how could they be 
harmonized, and what is the status quo of collaboration/mutual recognition 
between the EU and the USA? 
AEO and C-TPAT both aim to facilitate trade by granting certain benefits to low-
risk companies in return for their efforts to voluntarily comply with a set of security-
related standards. Both programs also grant benefits based on a three-level approach, 
although certain differences do exist. One of the main differences between the 
programs is the type of businesses admitted to the programs. Whereas AEO allows 
any economic operator that is involved in customs procedures in the EU to take part, 
C-TPAT only allows a defined set of businesses, with a strong emphasis on US and 
NAFTA-based businesses. 
With mutual recognition, U.S. CBP refers to the recognition of validation findings. 
Four major steps have been identified in order to mutually recognize C-TPAT and 
AEO. The first one, namely comparison in theory, has already been accomplished. 
AEO and C-TPAT in theory are compatible. The second step, comparison in practice, 
where experts from the EU and USA jointly perform validation processes in order to 
understand each other’s practical approach, has not yet been started. The most recent 
published document and information available on mutual recognition is the Abridged 
Roadmap Towards MR that was published in 2009. However, there are many actions 
to be taken by both the EU and the USA in order to mutually recognize the programs.  
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Port authorities: For port authorities it is a legal requirement to take part in 
certain security programs, such as ISPS and CSI. The main task of port authorities 
regarding ISPS is coordination. Port authorities do not however deal with AEO or C-
TPAT, but receive feedback from the industry regarding those programs. 
Carriers: The motivation to join AEO and C-TPAT for both carriers interviewed 
was market pressure. Participation in both programs was a requirement of the clients 
and the business environment, so it was essential for continuing operations without 
loss of business. 
Logistics providers: One logistics provider in the U.S. stated that market 
pressure, marketability and commitment to national safety were the primary reasons for 
C-TPAT compliance. The Austrian branch of another 3LP implemented AEO-C as it 
was a group-wide decision. 
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Desk research: The desk research has not mentioned motivation. One can 
assume that the theoretical motivation of businesses corresponds to the theoretical 
benefits of cargo security programs. 
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What benefits do businesses gain from the implementation of cargo 
security programs? 
Port authorities: In general, security programs are perceived to be 
advantageous as they contribute to overall security. The first-comer advantage of 
taking part in security programs and standards is also mentioned by port authorities. 
This again makes the port competitively more advantageous and marketable. 
However, as other ports catch up with the trend, this marketability is vanishing. 
Moreover, ISPS has optimized cargo flow, and tightened operational management 
across the ports. Criminal actions such as stealing have decreased. CSI operates 
seamlessly in ports, but there is no direct advantage for the port authority. AEO is 
generally perceived to be a positive tool. Recently it has even started to offer actual 
benefits to its members such as smoother cargo handling and reduced customs bonds. 
However companies seem to have mixed feelings about AEO certification. 
Carriers: No actual benefits could be found. Companies have described indirect 
advantages such as the first-mover advantage, usability of certifications for marketing 
purposes, organization of security-related thoughts and evidence of the company's 
concern in matters of security. Also, it appears that in practice even actual future 
benefits from AEO are still not clear. 
Logistics providers: As for C-TPAT, the U.S. branch does not gain any direct 
benefits. However, marketability and competitive advantage have been mentioned. 
AEO-F does not however seem to provide any benefits in practice, so marketability is 
also questionable. However, due to competitors, AEO-F may be important to keep up 
with. AEO-C certification on the other hand has resulted in a homogenous, more 
structured approach of the entire group to customs procedures.  
Desk research: The table below shows the theoretical benefits of both AEO and 
C-TPAT, as can be found in section 3.4.1 on page 59. 
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 AEO 
 
C-TPAT 
Hard benefits Depending on certification: 
Fewer controls (phys/doc) 
Upon control prioritization 
Choice of place of control 
Easier admittance to customs 
simplifications 
Reduced datasets 
Depending on certification: 
Reduction of risk score 
Fewer physical inspections 
Higher priority for examinations 
Fewer inspections of compliance 
Possible mitigation for penalties 
 
Soft benefits Improved relations to customs 
Company image/marketing 
Mutual recognition 
Access to information (E-
learning) 
Improved relations to customs 
Company image/marketing 
Networking 
Access to information 
Table 30: Benefits of AEO and C-TPAT in theory 
(Source: own creation) 
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Which challenges arise from the implementation of cargo security 
programs? 
Port authorities: The costs of ISPS mostly have to be borne by companies. 
Antwerp stated a rough estimation of 200,000 EUR for the port authority only. 
Rotterdam on the other hand stated that costs arising from ISPS have not been too 
high, and impossible to isolate from other expenditures. For CSI, no costs had to be 
borne by the port authorities. Also no disadvantages of ISPS and CSI were mentioned. 
As for the 100% scanning initiative of the USA, there were strong reservations from 
both authorities: It is clear that if this program is made mandatory, then ports will be 
bound to implement it. However the port authorities are not at all in favor of this 
program. Also, both Antwerp and Rotterdam have stated that in reality the 
implementation of such a program is not at all possible. Regarding AEO, it was 
mentioned that the program has not offered any advantages up to recently, and is 
slowly evolving. It is not yet fully worked out. 
Carriers: The only disadvantages arising from the implementation of security 
programs is the decrease of relative advantage with time if competitors later receive 
the same certificates. In addition, the risk of failing to comply, which might temporarily 
result in loss of business, was mentioned. Costs for preparation, certification and 
compliance are considered relatively low, as many of the required security measures 
already existed. Also, costs of implementation and operation cannot be directly 
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accounted to AEO or C-TPAT. During implementation, companies faced challenges 
with AEO especially: Every member state has a different approach and groups have to 
certificate each and every legal entity separately. Moreover, AEO's concept is not as 
easy to understand and the program is not as well communicated as C-TPAT is. In 
addition, AEO does not seem to be as developed as C-TPAT is. 
Logistics providers: One of the main disadvantages arising from cargo security 
programs is the increase of liability for not fully controllable incidents. Moreover, the 
programs have been criticized for outsourcing highly costly governmental tasks of 
national security to businesses. Concerns have been raised in regard to the 
submission and storage of security-related data. In addition, regarding C-TPAT, the 
requirement of conducting business only with C-TPAT members or C-TPAT compliant 
companies was mentioned. 
General criticisms of AEO: The author perceived that there is a strong aversion 
and even criticism on AEO. The program does not seem to be as developed as C-
TPAT is, application may be harder for groups, and actual benefits are lower than 
promoted. Overall, businesses seem to have mixed feelings about AEO. 
Desk research: No challenges and disadvantages could be identified in desk 
research. Literature mainly focuses on benefits. 
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How would companies benefit from a mutual recognition/harmonization of 
different programs? 
Port authorities: As port authorities are not directly affected by AEO and C-
TPAT, the question regarding mutual recognition of these has been skipped. 
Carrier: The author found out during the interviews that companies expect 
mutual recognition to decrease bureaucracy, and that such programs are perceived to 
complement each other. 
Logistics providers: In practice, C-TPAT companies tend to accept AEO 
certificates and vice versa. Thus, mutual recognition would not have a big impact on 
businesses that already have certification.  
Desk research: The author found that the expectation of companies correspond 
to the theoretical aspects. As soon as programs are mutually recognized, companies 
would not have to spend extra resources on double validations and revalidations. In 
addition, compliance would be easier, as only one set of rules would need to be 
complied with. 
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Since September 11, 2001 the focus of supply chain security has shifted from 
measures against loss, theft and damage to the possibility of terrorist attacks. That 
includes the possibility of terrorist attacks during shipping, or the moving of tools or 
weapons needed by terrorists. Governments – especially in the USA – have been 
seeking additional security measures in order to eliminate the possibility of further 
terrorist actions. Due to these new high security standards, however, trade has 
declined significantly. Therefore there was a need to somehow facilitate trade while at 
the same time making it more secure. The need for trade security on the one hand and 
trade facilitation programs on the other have driven the USA and EU to develop sets of 
initiatives completing each other. Needless to say, the USA has occupied a leading 
role regarding security programs. 
With EC Regulation No. 648/2005, the EU has focused on a mutual information 
system with a single-window approach for advance notification of cargo imported, 
transited or exported into and from the European Union. This single window integrates 
the Automated Import System (AIS), Import Control System (ICS), New Computerised 
Transit System (NCTS), Automated Export System (AES) and Export Control System 
(ECS). The same regulation has brought a voluntary program, Authorised Economic 
Operator (AEO), into being in order to secure and facilitate trade across the entire 
supply chain. 
The USA reacted to the terrorist attacks very rapidly with a set of programs in 
order to increase security. With MTSA and the SAFE Port Act, counteracting programs 
were created such as Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Secure Freight Initiative 
(SFI) as well as the Automated Manifest Rule (AMS) with the 24-Hour Advance 
Manifest Rule (24-Hour Rule) and Importer Security Filing (ISF). In addition, a 
voluntary program called Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was 
created in order to facilitate trade into the USA. 
On an international level the World Customs Organization (WCO) has created 
the SAFE Framework, and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
framework has been developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
All programs described above have one aim: To secure parts or the entire supply 
chain against terrorist attacks and other threats. They can be categorized either by 
country of origin, by the trading partners involved in the security measures (exporter, 
logistics provider, carrier, port facilities, sea carrier and importer), by the layer they are 
operating at (data, inspection or customs-to-business partnership), or whether they are 
voluntary or not. Companies operating between the EU and the USA certainly need to 
comply with both the EU's and the USA's set of requirements. Especially when it 
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comes to AEO and C-TPAT, it would be advantageous for customs authorities and 
businesses to collaborate to a certain extent in order to save resources. The EU and 
USA are willing to mutually recognize validation processes of AEO and C-TPAT. 
Mutual recognition is a long process. Both the EU and the USA agree that the 
programs are compatible in theory. Mutual recognition has however been postponed 
repeatedly. An Abridged Roadmap Towards Mutual Recognition, published in 2009, 
outlines numerous steps to be taken by both the EU and the USA. However, publicly it 
is not known when AEO and C-TPAT will be mutually recognized. 
The three case studies show practical aspects of cargo security initiatives from 
port authorities', carriers' and logistics providers' points of view and allow a practical 
insight into the field of research. They also allowed the three practical research 
questions to be answered. 
Cargo security initiatives such as AEO and C-TPAT are generally perceived to be 
advantageous. However, in contrast to the theoretical benefits, companies tend to only 
receive indirect benefits such as first-comer and competitive advantage and 
marketability. Also, it was mentioned that the requirements of these initiatives resulted 
in a more structured approach towards security. AEO-C for instance has resulted in a 
more homogenous approach of a company group to customs procedures. 
Costs for implementation have been considered either not measureable or not 
that high by port authorities, carriers and logistics providers. Port authorities raised 
concerns about the 100% scanning program of the USA. Increased liability and the 
inability to comply with standards have been identified by carriers and logistics 
providers in regard to AEO and C-TPAT. AEO was generally perceived to be less 
structured, less matured and more complicated to implement for groups of companies. 
Moreover, theoretical benefits have not yet been met fully. 
With regards to mutual recognition, the case studies have shown different 
approaches of companies. On the one hand, some of the interviewed companies 
stated that mutual recognition of AEO and C-TPAT might be advantageous, but on the 
other hand there was also a belief that mutual recognition would not have a great 
impact on business operations. Another interviewee stated that AEO and C-TPAT do 
complement each other in certain ways. 
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very interesting that certain concerns are being raised by the industry, especially 
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Based on the actual AEO Self-Assessment provided by the European Union (EC, 
2007b). 
1. Economic operator Information 
1.1. Organisational characteristics 
1.2. Internal organization 
1.3. Volume of business 
1.4. Information on customs matters 
2. Compliance Record 
2.1. Compliance history 
2.2. Intelligence information 
3. The accounting and logistical system of the business 
3.1. Audit trail 
3.2. Accounting and logistical system 
3.3. Internal control system 
3.4. Flow of goods 
3.5. Making customs declarations and the use of customs agents 
3.6. Procedures as regards back-up, recovery and fallback and archiving 
3.7. Information security – protection of computer systems 
3.8. Information security – documentation security 
4. Financial solvency 
4.1. Proven solvency 
5. Safety and security requirements 
5.1. Security assessment conducted by the applicant (self assessment) 
5.2. Physical security 
5.3. Cargo units 
5.4. Logistical processes 
5.5. Incoming goods 
5.6. Storage of goods 
5.7. Manufacturing of the goods 
5.8. Loading of goods 
5.9. Security requirements on suppliers 
5.10. Personnel security 
5.11. External services 
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Source: EC, 2006b, p. 4 
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Source: U.S. CBP, 2007d 
In the Americas and Caribbean: 
1. Montreal, Vancouver & Halifax, Canada 
2. Santos, Brazil 
3. Buenos Aires, Argentina 
4. Puerto Cortes, Honduras 
5. Caucedo, Dominican Republic 
6. Kingston, Jamaica 
7. Freeport, The Bahamas 
8. Balboa, Colón and Manzanillo, Panama 
9. Cartagena, Colombia 
In Europe: 
10. Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
11. Bremerhaven & Hamburg, Germany 
12. Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium 
13. Le Havre and Marseille, France 
14. Gothenburg, Sweden 
15. La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy 
16. Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, United 
Kingdom (U.K.) 
17. Piraeus, Greece 
18. Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia, Spain 
19. Lisbon, Portugal 
In Asia and the East: 
20. Singapore 
21. Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan 
22. Hong Kong 
23. Pusan, South Korea 
24. Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia 
25. Laem Chabang, Thailand 
26. Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
27. Shenzhen and Shanghai 
28. Kaohsiung and Chi-Lung 
29. Colombo, Sri Lanka 
30. Port Salalah, Oman 
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31. Port Qasim, Pakistan 
32. Port of Ashdod, Israel 
33. Port in Haifa, Israel 
In Africa: 
34. Durban, South Africa 
35. Alexandria, Egypt 
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Source: EC, 2009d, pp. 3-5
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Last 
 
First Position Company Date 
Lorenzen Lars Head of Security Maersk Line 22/SEP/2010 
Barendregt Jan Senior Business Mng. Port of Rotterdam 24/SEP/2010 
Verhaegen Rik Head of Port Security Port of Antwerp 30/SEP/2010 
Bräun Martin Customer Order Mng. Hamburg Süd DE 05/OCT/2010 
Donahue Colleen Compliance Manager Cargo Partner USA 04/OCT/2010 
Neuwirth Martin Safety Advisor DB Schenker AT 19/OCT/2010 
Dehe Rainer Director Operations Hamburg Süd USA 13/OCT/2010 
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This is the interview outline that served as a basis for the individually tailored 
questionnaires, that have been provided to interviewees. 
The main aim of this interview is to undestand: 
• The difference in actual and anticipated benefits, costs and workload, 
• The process of implementation, 
• How the programs and requirements have changed business processes and 
everyday operations, 
• Awaited benefits from mutual recognition of C-TPAT and AEO. 
 
1. Motivation 
a. Why did your company implement cargo security programs/standards 
(AEO/C-TPAT,...)? 
b. What benefits did you expect from the programs/standards prior to 
implementation? 
2. Implementation 
a. Describe the preparation/implementation process in detail! 
b. Which division/subsidiary/HQ has coordinated the incorporation? 
c. How much did the implementation cost your company? If you cannot 
measure those costs, how do you know that the introduction pays off? 
d. How did the workload increase during implementation? 
e. Did implementation hinder your daily business? How? 
f. Did other standards or programs (that you had already implemented) 
support the implementation process? 
g. Did you employ consulting companies? What was their task? 
3. Daily application of the program today 
a. What measures did you have to take in order to comply with the 
program's standard? 
b. How about the recurring/running costs? 
c. How did workload in every day business due to the introduction of the 
program? 
d. What are the disadvantages from taking part in the program? 
e. What are the actual benefits from the program? How do you measure 
them? 
4. Do the actual benefits meet your anticipation? 
5. Mutual recognition of programs 
a. Why does it make sence to participate in both AEO and C-TPAT? 
b. What is your opinion about mutual recognition of these programs? 
Would it advantageous for your company? 
 
